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 Summary  
 
 
Early Buddhism offered a new orientation to the philosophical discussions in early Indian 
thought. It made a significant contribution particularly to the field of epistemological 
discussions. It proposes a process of individual verification of empirical world which is 
necessary for achieving its aimed end, the freedom from suffering. This exemplified 
notion of verification in early Buddhism has been interpreted mainly by K.N. Jayatilleke 
and Frank J. Hoffman. Jayatilleke interprets this notion as akin to western empiricist 
tradition. Hoffman argues against Jayatilleke and identifies this notion as based on 
religious experience in the sense analogous to that of Western theistic religions.  
 
Both interpretations, in my judgment, do not capture the full significance of the early 
Buddhist verification. Both scholars remarkably have failed to recognize a fundamental 
aspect of the early Buddhist notion of verification, that is, its deconstructive nature, due 
to their overdependence on preconceived Western categories in their interpretations.  In 
the early Buddhist perspective sensory experience is a construct embedded in various 
factors of human personality and, therefore, the early Buddhist verification of empirical 
reality is predominantly deconstructive in nature, that is, verification in early Buddhism 
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Since the last decades of 19th century, it has been possible for the intellectual 
raditions of both East and West to encounter each other.  This cross-cultural encounter 
has created the possibility of seeing similarities across the traditions and to interpret and 
evaluate one’s own in relation to the other. In the case of Buddhism, the Buddhist 
literature, particularly the Pāli canon, has been available for Western scholars thanks 
mainly to accumulated English translations.1 Native scholars in the countries where 
Buddhism has been predominant were also exposed to Western intellectual traditions. 
With this encounter comparative studies between Buddhism and Western thought started.  
 
In the early stages of comparative studies the emphasis was more on similarities 
and compatibilities between Buddhism and Western philosophy. These comparative 
studies revealed that Buddhism had explored many of the seemingly same basic questions 
that had been dealt with in the Western philosophical context and had articulated the 
answers to those questions in its own way. Moreover those studies tried to explain the 
Buddhist teachings in terms of the ‘isms’ of philosophy i.e. empiricism, idealism etc.2   
 
Following the above trend there emerged another strand of comparative thinking 
that highlighted the incompatibilities of Buddhism with Western philosophy proper. 
                                                 
1 T.W. Rhys Davids was the pioneer in making Pāli canon available for western scholars by establishing 
Pali Text Society in London in 1881for translating Pali literature into English.    
2 Beside Jayatilleke see A.K. Warder (empiricism), Indian Buddhism (Delhi, 1980[1970]) p. 299 ff., 
Bhattācharya V. (rationalism), The Basic Conception of Buddhism (Calcutta, 1934) p.9ff, A.B. Keith (naïve 
realism) Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, (New York, 1974 [1922]) p. 53ff. For some 
observations in this regard see G. Chataline, “Early Indian Buddhism and the Nature of Philosophy: A 






These studies argued that early comparative thinking had ‘strait-jacketed’ Buddhism into 
a preconceived philosophical framework distorting its unique character. These works 
show that there are other important features of Buddhism that were ignored in 
interpreting Buddhism purely in ‘philosophical’ terms. It is noteworthy that some of these 
studies with their emphasis on the ‘non-rational’ character of Buddhism critiqued the 
philosophical interpretations and comfortably interpreted through another Western 
category, namely, “religion”.    
 
K.N. Jayatilleke (Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, 1963) seems to represent 
the first movement while Frank. J. Hoffman (Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism, 
1987) seems to fall within the particular group of the subsequent trend which interprets 
Buddhism as analogous to “what we should call religion in the West.” Interestingly both 
scholars base their studies on Buddhism represented in Pāli canon, which is often called 
“early Buddhism.” 
 
It seems that the above two interpretations of early Buddhism rely heavily on the 
Western distinction between philosophy and religion. The western world, a long time 
ago, made a clear distinction between philosophy and religion, polarizing them into 
separate realms. Philosophy in the West is usually defined as the rigorous exercise of 
rationality, thus it is confined within the realm of reason. Whatever is beyond this realm 







Richard King observes that the ancient Greek distinction between mythos and 
logos ―often seen as the seminal act in the invention of ‘philosophy’― functions in a 
context to exclude a great deal from the category of ‘philosophy’ both within western 
cultures and further afield.3 Edmund Husserl while recognizing the possibility of similar 
“philosophies” in non Western cultures points out a peculiar “theoretical” character of 
Greek philosophy.  
 
But only in the Greeks do we have a universal (“cosmological”) life interest in 
the essentially new form of a purely “theoretical” attitude, and this as a 
communal form in which this interest works itself out for internal 
reasons…These are men who, not in isolation but with one another and for one 
another…strive for and bring about theoria and nothing but theoria, whose 
growth and constant perfection, with broadening of the circle of cowokers and 
succession of the generations of inquirers, is finally taken up into the will with 
the sense of an infinite and common task. The theoretical attitude has its 
historical origin in the Greeks.4  
 
King further asserts that the Greek distinction between mythos and logos was 
reinforced with the growth of secularism in Europe during the Enlightenment.  
 
…with the rise of the natural sciences (especially physics) as a 
distinctive intellectual discipline, philosophers tended to shift their 
                                                 
3 Richard King, Indian Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) p. 10 
4 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of Europian Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, (Tr.) David Carr 






attention towards what one might call the ‘metaphysical’… However, 
with the growth of secularism in Northern Europe during the 
Enlightenment, philosophy increasingly divorced itself from theology, 
which was more obviously concerned with the realm of the spiritual.5  
 
Thus, certain historical developments in the West allowed the dominance of 
reason over other cognitive apparatus in human understanding. Consequently philosophy 
was defined as that which can be understood and confirmed through reason. This 
restricted view of philosophy tends to consider whatever is not confirmed through reason 
as unphilosophical or religious.  
 
However, in Indian thought, from which Buddhism emerged, the demarcation 
between philosophy and religion has never been so pronounced. ‘Philosophy’ and 
‘religion’, as defined in the West, are not considered to be two separate activities in 
Indian thought. Particularly early Indian thought, the context out of which early 
Buddhism emerged, lacks this distinction completely.6 This is basically due to the lack of 
sharp distinctions between theory and practice. The vision of the good life and the way to 
the good life were not taken separately but were regarded as a single enterprise. Thus 
Indian thought, particularly early Indian traditions, in the words of Koller: 
                                                 
5 Ibid. p. 3 
6 Early Buddhism consists of the themes that can be categorized in the Western viewpoint to both 
philosophy and religion. One finds it difficult in attempting to define early Buddhism as a philosophy or as 
a religion in the strict sense of the terms due to lack of the distinction of philosophy and religion in early 
Buddhism. D. Seyfort Ruegg observes that scholars of Buddhism regard the subject of their studies as both 
a religion and a philosophy. However they do not seem to rely on the strict distinction between the two 
terms. “If, for its students, Buddhism is both a philosophy and a religion in some meaningful sense of these 
two words, it is neither according to certain current definitions conditioned by the history of these 
subjects”.  See D. Seyfort Ruegg, “Some Reflections on the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Buddhism” 







…respond[s] to both practical and speculative motivations. Practical 
considerations motivated the search for ways to overcome the various forms 
of suffering. Speculative considerations led to constructions of explanatory 
accounts of the nature of reality and of human existence. But these 
considerations were not undertaken separately. The understanding and 
knowledge derived from speculative curiosity were utilized in the practical 
attempts to overcome suffering.7    
 
It is now obvious that interpreting early Buddhism purely in terms of philosophy 
(in the Western sense) and purely in terms of religion (in the Western sense) is apt to 
distort its natural feature.   
 
Moreover it should be noted here that with the sharp distinction between religion 
and philosophy the West maintains a restricted notion of philosophyrestricted to 
“reason” alone. This excludes many non-Western intellectual traditions from 
philosophical studies and the epithet “religious” is generally used to name them in a 
denigrating sense. Richard King astutely comments: 
 
The distinction excludes, for example, a great deal of “African philosophy” by 
virtue of the cultural embeddedness of much traditional African thought in a 
‘story-telling’ format. This is not such a problem in the quest for ‘authentic 
                                                 






Indian philosophy’ since there is much in Indian culture which conforms to the 
narrow confines of the ‘logos’ rubric. However, even the distinction excludes 
material that might be of interest in the Vedic hymns, the Upanishads, and the 
Buddhist sËtras etc.8 
 
With regard to early Buddhism, Sungtaek Cho remarks:  
 
From the Buddhist perspective, all philosophical speculation is based on a 
meditative experience, which is clearly distinguished from our daily, rational 
experience. In the Western philosophical tradition, this could provide sufficient 
reason to disqualify Buddhism as a philosophical system. The lack of division 
between philosophy and religion within the Buddhist tradition, however, does 
not imply that Buddhist thought is primitive or less philosophically 
sophisticated than Western thought. One should avoid the temptation to ask 
whether it is Western philosophy or Buddhism that is more philosophical. 
Buddhism is rather a different way of engaging in philosophy that emerged 
from a different culture.9 
 
What the above discussion suggests is the need to comprehend and to interpret 
non-western thought, in this case a particular aspect of Indian thought, within its own 
terms. The studies of non-Western traditions should aim to recognize what is genuinely 
                                                 
8 Richard King, op.cit. p. 10 
9 “The Rationalist Tendency in Modern Buddhist Scholarship: A Revaluation” in Philosophy East & West, 






distinctive in the contributions that they have made. On this count, Eliot Deutsch makes 
an insightful remark:  
 
…one’s primary concern in exploration of other traditions ought not to be that 
of simply finding more of oneself and what is familiar to one, but of learning 
about other possibilities of philosophical experience that can be opened up to 
one through cross- cultural encounter.10   
 
This study intends to show that interpreting the notions of early Buddhism with 
strict reference to philosophy or religion (in Western sense of the terms) does not grasp 
the full significance of those notions. This study examines two interpretations of early 
Buddhism, which concern the notion of verification found in early Buddhist discourses. It 
aims to reveal the weaknesses of these interpretations which are, in my judgment, deeply 
problematic; and, further I wish to show that they fail to comprehend the full significance 
of the early Buddhist notion of verification.       
 
Jayatilleke’s Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge investigates the early Buddhist 
critique of means of knowledge accepted in the pre Buddhist traditions, such as anussava 
(authority or testimony) and takka (a priori reasoning). Jayatilleke’s position recognizes a 
notion of verification in early Buddhism, which emphasizes the primacy of sensory 
experience. His analysis shows that valid knowledge in early Buddhism is what is 
                                                 
10 A Companion to World Philosophies (ed) Eliot Deutsch & Ron Bontekoe, (Oxford: Blackwell 






verified through direct sensory experience. He proceeds to interpret early Buddhism by 
claiming that this notion of verification stands akin to the empiricist tradition in the West.   
 
Hoffman’s Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism argues against the empiricist 
interpretation of early Buddhism. Hoffman shows that early Buddhism is not comparable 
to categories of western empiricism. In this study Hoffman examines the roles of saddhā 
(“confidence,” “faith”) and abhiññā (“higher modes of knowledge”), which are stages of 
early Buddhist notion of verification, to show that they are more like elements of 
religious belief. He moves on to refute the “empiricism thesis” and concludes that the 
nature of “verification” appropriate to Buddhism is that of a “religious experience” (in 
the sense analogous to that of Western theistic religions)  
  
Jayatilleke’s treatment of early Buddhist notion of verification seems to be a 
faithful presentation of the Pāli Nikāya texts. He correctly reveals the primacy of direct 
sensory experience given in early Buddhist notion of verification. In doing so, in my 
view, Jayatilleke has identified an important aspect of early Buddhist verification, that is, 
the experiential aspect. Although he identifies the experiential aspect, his interpretation of 
the early Buddhist notion of verification seems to be partial towards empiricism of 
Western philosophy. Jayatilleke while presenting a thorough analysis of the issues 
relevant to early Buddhist notion of verification puts an extra emphasis, in my judgment, 
on the compatibility of the notion with empiricist and positivist traditions in Western 
philosophy. Then again the criticism against Jayatilleke leveled by Hoffman, though 






categories of empiricism, seems to be partial towards the Western concept of “religion.” 
Hoffman considers that the means of verification recognized in early Buddhism are 
notions applicable only within a “religious belief” in the Western sense of the term. Thus, 
the  nature of “verification” appropriate to early Buddhism, according to him, is that of a 
“religious experience” in the sense analogous to that of Western theistic religions.11   
 
  Both scholars seem to maintain an over dependence on Western categories in their 
interpretations. Jayatilleke interprets early Buddhist verification with strict reference to 
empiricism of Western philosophy while Hoffman interprets it with strict reference to the 
Western concept of religion. These interpretations do not grasp the full significance of the 
notion of verification due to their strict reference to categories of Western philosophy and 
Western conception of religion. I will argue that both scholars remarkably have failed to 
recognize a fundamental aspect of early Buddhist verification, that is, its deconstructive 
nature. I will argue for a different understanding of the early Buddhist notion of 
verification, which demonstrates its deconstructive nature. What is meant by 
“deconstruction” here is to be understood, in short, as the analytical realization of the 
constructed and embedded nature of experience. This realization, in turn, allows one to 
                                                 
11 Hoffman’s treatment of religious experience heavily relies on the definitions given to that of Western 
theistic religions. He refers to Sutherland’s definition of “religious experience” and interprets early 
Buddhist means of verification in this light. Sutherland argues against interpreting unusual experiences in 
the context of Western theistic religions as evidence for religious belief. He argues that it is faith of the 
believer that gives credibility to his unusual or religious experiences. Thus “ Initially and fundamentally a 
religious experience is characterized as such in the light of the individual in question, rather than in the 
light of any unusual perceptions, or celestial fireworks display which may accompany that experience”  See 








penetrate through and to phenomenologically dislodge those embedded conceptual layers 
of experience12 
 
  I will argue that Jayatilleke’s treatment correctly recognizes the evident primacy 
of experience in the early Buddhist notion of verification, but that he overemphasizes the 
compatibility of this notion with Western empiricism. I will also argue that Hoffman’s 
critique of Jayatilleke underestimates the experiential aspect of the early Buddhist notion 
of verification, and his interpretation of the early Buddhist notion of verification with 
strict reference to “religious experience”, in the sense analogous to that of Western 
theistic religions, is an oversimplification. I will further argue that the interpretations of 
these writers fail to recognize the deconstructive nature of the early Buddhist notion of 
verification. I will show that in the early Buddhist perspective sensory experience is a 
construct embedded in various factors of human personality and, therefore, the early 
Buddhist verification of empirical reality is predominantly deconstructive in nature, that 
is, verification in early Buddhism requires an analytical deconstruction of embedded 
layers of experience. 
 
Chapter 1 of this study will first clarify the term “early Buddhism”; it will then 
proceed to examine the two interpretations offered by Jayatilleke and Hoffman regarding 
the notion of verification in early Buddhism. It will present Jayatilleke’s treatment of 
relevant early Buddhist materials and his emphasis on the primacy of experience that is 
evident in the early Buddhist notion of verification. Then I will present the Hoffman 
                                                 
12. To “deconstruct” one’s acquired experience in this sense one needs, of course, a cognitive training. It is 
this cognitive training that Early Buddhism lays down in its meditational practices. I discuss this point a bit 






critique of Jayatilleke’s interpretation and his position on the early Buddhist notion of 
verification.   
 
Chapter 2 will discuss the limitations of these two interpretations. First, it will 
show Jayatilleke’s overemphasis on the compatible aspects of the early Buddhist notion 
of verification with empiricism and his failure to see sensory experience in the early 
Buddhist perspective as a construct embedded in the habitual conceptual framework of 
the subject. Then it will disclose the degree to which Hoffman underestimates the 
experiential aspect of the early Buddhist notion of verification. It will further discuss 
Hoffman’s generalization of early Buddhist verification with “religious experience” in 
the Western theistic sense. Finally the chapter will show the failure to both scholars to 
recognize the deconstructive nature of the early Buddhist notion of verification. 
 
The early Buddhist critical evaluation of the embeddedness of conceptual 
knowledge is discussed in Chapter 3.  This chapter makes the point that experience is 
embedded in the habitual conceptual framework, inherent presumptions and 
psychological urges of human personality. It will also show the embeddedness of 
meditative experiences.  
 
Given that experience is embedded in both cognitive and non-cognitive factors of 
human personality, Chapter 4 will argue that the early Buddhist notion of verification is 
predominantly deconstructive in nature.  It will show that both ordinary sensory 
























Chapter 1  




In this chapter I examine the two interpretations offered by Jayatilleke and 
Hoffman regarding the notion of verification in early Buddhism. First of all I will clarify 
the meaning of the term “early Buddhism” to make clear the form of Buddhism that is the 
focus of this study.  Secondly, I will discuss Jayatilleke’s interpretation of the early 
Buddhist notion of verification. Lastly I will discuss Hoffman’s critique of Jayatilleke 
and Hoffman’s position on the early Buddhist notion of verification.  
 
1.1 What is Early Buddhism 
Buddhism as a spiritual tradition, serving humanity for more than two and a half 
millennia, has spread to many regions of India and the world. It has gone through certain 
developments in the course of its long history. As Buddhism migrated to various 
geographical regions certain aspects became emphasized in each area. Buddhism was 
adapted to meet the requirement of the people of each area, generating a wide variety of 
interpretations and practices. Today we find three main traditions of Buddhism, namely 
Theravada, Mahayana and Vajrayana.  
The term ‘early Buddhism’ is used by recent scholars to refer to the original form 






the teaching of the historical Buddha, Siddhārtha Gautama, who lived in 6th century 
B.C.E. in North India. One way of tracing ‘early Buddhism’ is to refer to the earliest 
strata of Buddhist literature as preserved within various traditions of Buddhism.  
It should be kept in mind that the teachings of the Buddha were first transmitted 
orally, and were not committed to writing until the 1st century B.C.E. Over the 
succeeding centuries the Buddha’s teachings were both systematized and expanded upon. 
The standard canonical literature is generally called the Tripi aka (threefold basket or 
collection).13  The first part, the Vinayapi aka (the collection of disciplinary rules), 
contains the monastic rules for Buddhist monks and nuns. The Suttapi aka, or Sutrapi aka 
(the collection of discourses) contains dialogues and discourses of the Buddha. The third 
and final, or Abhidhammapi aka (the collection of metaphysics), is mainly an analytical 
and methodological elaboration of the previous pi akas. This last collection allocated 
space for further and later commentarial elaborations and interpretations. When 
developments in Buddhism gave rise to different traditions, the Abhidhammapi aka was 
used to preserve sectarian interpretations. Consequently, the contents of the last 
collection is not common to all later Buddhist traditions; each later tradition having more 
or less their own Abhidhammapi aka. 
However, the collection called the Sutta Pi aka (the basket of discourses) is 
recognized as the earliest literary source that is available in all Buddhist traditions. 
Traditionally it is accepted that this collection was compiled at the first council which 
was held three months after the Buddha’s demise. The archeological evidence for the 
                                                 
 
13 The name refers to the baskets passed from hand to hand by construction workers, and is thus a metaphor 






early existence of the Sutta Pi aka is found in Asoka’s inscriptions. For example, the 
BhābrË edict of Asoka recommends seven passages for the study of his co-religionists. 
The ingenuity of all seven passages has been identified with certain passages of the Sutta 
Pi aka. This shows that the Sutta Pi aka as we have it now had come to existence before 
Asoka’s time.  
Importantly, the collection of the Sutta pi aka is common to all Buddhist tradi-
tions. It is called ‘nikāya’ in the Pāli (Theravada) tradition, ‘āgama’ in the Sanskrit tradi-
tion, and ‘a-han’ in the Chinese translations. Unfortunately, except for a rare few frag-
ments, the Sanskrit Āgama collections is lost to us. Only counterpart Chinese translations 
are available. The Pāli Nikāyas are preserved within the Theravada tradition and are 
available today, and have been translated into numerous languages. According to Keith, 
the evidence of the Chinese translations as well as of the fragments in Sanskrit and vari-
ous languages used in Central Asia, which have been recently discovered, shows the exis-
tence of a series of texts, the D¥rghāgama, the Madhyamāgama, the Sa◊yuktāgama, the 
Ekottarāgama with four Pāli Nikāyas and of several texts which are found in the fifth Pāli 
Nikāya.14  
The common doctrines accepted by all Buddhist traditions, such as the Four No-
ble Truths, Dependent Origination, the Three Marks of Existence, and the doctrine of 
Karma are found in Pāli Nikāyas in their original sense. Other developed doctrinal 
conceptions that are peculiar to each tradition can also be found within these Nikāyas in 
                                                 






their germinal form. There are other linguistic, ideological and historical evidences that 
show the antiquity of Pāli Nikāyas.15 
Although we take the Pali Nikāyas as the oldest literary source of Buddhism, the 
question as to what extent these represent the word of the historical Buddha remains. 
Richard Gombrich makes an interesting remark on this issue.  
No one was in a position to record or reproduce the Buddha’s sermons as 
he uttered them. The texts preserved did not just drop from his lips; they must be 
products of deliberate compositions―in fact, they were composed to be memo-
rized. This inevitably introduces a certain formalization: such features as 
versification, numbered lists, repetition and stock formulae are all aids to mem-
ory. Vedic literature includes texts which display all these features.16  
It is interesting to note that there are references in the Pali Nikāyas themselves 
that refer to the suttas learnt by heart. There is a sutta in the Udāna vagga where the 
Buddha asks a young follower to recite some teaching that he has learnt, and the follower 
recites ‘The section of Eights’ which is a part of the Sutta-nipāta in Khuddaka Nikāya. 
From this it is clear that the method of composing and memorizing was in use even dur-
ing the Buddha’s time. This also makes it clear that some parts of the Sutta Pi aka were 
fixed during the life of the Buddha. The systematization of Buddha’s sermons, as is found 
in the Pāli Nikāyas, is not a method adopted later, as Gombrich asserts.  
                                                 
15 The antiquity of the language of the Nikāyas, Pāli (which is recognized as the literary form of local 
dialects used in north India in early centuries), the cross references to the themes of the early Upanishads 
found in Pāli Nikāyas, and the human character attributed to the Buddha in Pāli Nikāyas point to the 
antiquity of Pāli Nikāyas. See A.B. Keith, op. cit. pp 1-33, Rhys Davids, Cambridge History of India I, p. 
180 ff., Oldenberg (ed.) Vinaya Pitaka,(London: 1879) p.iv 
16 “Recovering the Buddha’s Message” in The Buddhist Forum Vol. 1, Seminar Papers 1987-1988 (ed.) 






As we know, many texts do purport to reproduce the Buddha’s sermons. If 
in doing so they employ various of the conventions of oral literature, schematiz-
ing the material by the use of formulae and stock passages, this is no argument 
against their essential authenticity.17  
The contents of Pāli Nikāyas may include several chronological strata but it is 
impossible to establish any definitive chronological strata within them. The Pāli Nikāyas, 
which consists of an enormous amount of stereotyped materials, both verse and prose, are 
the redactions of floating materials in which old and new have commingled. However, it 
is clear that the Pāli Nikāyas are the available preserved records that represent the early 
teachings of Buddhism.  
Thus in this study the term “early Buddhism” refers to what is represented in the 
Pāli Nikāyas. The Pāli Nikāyas consist of five sections: 1.) Digha Nikaya, “The Collec-
tion of Long Discourses,” 2.) Majjhima Nikaya, “The Collection of Middle Length 
Discourses,” 3.) Samyutta Nikaya, “The Collection of Connected Discourses,” 4.) 
Anguttara Nikaya, “The Collection of Numerical Discourses”, and 5.) Khuddaka Nikaya, 
“The Collection of Minor texts” (among fifteen texts included in this collection, Sutta Ni-
pāta, the Itivuttaka and the Dhammapada are used in this study).  
 
  
                                                 






1.2 The Notion of Verification 
In early Indian thought, early Buddhism provides an unprecedented emphasis on 
epistemology. The prime motive as well as the whole purpose of undertaking training and 
cultivation under the Buddha is well expressed in a statement by his early disciples. Their 
endeavor was “for knowledge, insight, attainment, realization, and comprehension of 
what is not known, not seen, not attained, not realized and not comprehended”.18 This 
passage clearly indicates that early Buddhism aims at a certain kind of knowledge, a 
knowledge that is supposed to bring about an inner transformation of the person, which 
grants freedom from suffering (vimutti).  This knowledge that brings about the inner 
transformation is resulted through verification of reality as it is. Thus it is essential in 
early Buddhism to verify the empirical world in its actuality to achieve the freedom of 
suffering, the ultimate goal of early Buddhism. This verification of the empirical world in 
its true nature is ultimately a personal acquaintance (saya◊ abhiññå) through  individual 
effort. If one is interested in this verification, each individual has to try it for oneself, 
though other enlightened persons are capable of providing guidelines. Therefore early 
Buddhist doctrine is qualified as ‘individually verifiable by the wise’ (paccatta◊ 
veditabbo).19  
  
In a discourse that gives guidelines to distinguish between true and false claims, it 
is stated that one should accept a statement as true only when one has a personal 
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knowledge of it (attanåva janeyyåtha).20 This emphasis on the validity of personal direct 
experience is explicit in almost every aspect of early Buddhist thought.   
 
Thus we need to attend to a notion of personal verification. Such notion of 
personal verification is one of the issues which attracted the attention of scholars of 
comparative studies.  
 
1.3 Jayatilleke’s Treatment  
K N Jayatilleke, in his monumental work, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, 
recognizes the notion of verification in early Buddhism and gives due attention to it. In 
his investigation into the epistemological issues found in Pali Nikāyas he considers this 
notion of personal verification as the core in early Buddhist theory of knowledge. 
Jayatilleke’s upholding of the notion of personal verification is evident in four conceptual 
areas in his treatise, namely: 
 
1. The critique of pre-Buddhist means of knowledge.  
2. The Buddha’s own experimental attempt for enlightenment.  
3. The verifiability of the doctrines of early Buddhism. 
4. The concept of ‘meaningless statements’. 
 
                                                 






In analyzing the pre-Buddhist background of epistemology, Jayatilleke enumerates 
an early Buddhist classification of preceding and contemporary thinkers of the Buddha in 
respect of their accepted means of knowledge. The classification is threefold. 
 
1. Traditionalists (anussāvika) who accepted the authority of divine revelation, 
scriptures and religious teachers.  
2. Rationalists (takkī, vima◊sī) who depend on reasoning and speculations.  
3. Experientialists (saya◊  abhiññā) who depend on direct personal experiences 
including extra sensory perception.  
 
The Buddha identifies himself as a member of the last group. Jayatilleke thinks that 
the Buddha’s identification with experientialists not only gives a clue to the Buddhist 
critique of other epistemological grounds but also clarifies the early Buddhist standpoint 
on knowledge as one which is based on one’s direct experience or personal verification. 
He then presents the Buddhist critique of the authority of testimonies and mere reasoning. 
The authority of testimonies here mainly refers to the reliance on religious scriptures such 
as the Vedas. The latter means the exercising of logical reasoning and speculation without 
necessarily referring to the religious scriptures in formulating theories and views. One is 
advised not to accept any statement as true solely on the grounds of the above sources. 
The correct attitude towards the above sources of knowledge should be in the way that 
“we may provisionally accept a proposition [from any source] for the purpose of 






proposition is true prior to verification”.21 With textual evidence he shows that these 
means of knowledge are considered unsatisfactory primarily because the knowledge one 
derives from them is not “personally realized and directly verified by oneself”. He 
comments, “… even if a belief based on authority is true, it is not the same as knowledge 
as defined and accepted in Buddhism and therefore it is not to be regarded as 
knowledge”.22 Thus a valid means of knowledge in early Buddhism is in contrast to 
traditional authority and speculative theories. Even the forms of higher knowledge 
recognized in early Buddhism, for Jayatilleke, were not claimed to have derived from a 
supernatural source in an “unaccountable manner” but is explained as a product of the 
natural development of the mind. Regarding the forms of higher knowledge, he is not 
willing to call them even “intuitive”. As all those forms of higher knowledge ultimately 
have to depend on “cognition of the senses”, he refers to this form of knowledge as 
“extrasensory knowledge”.23  
 
Jayatilleke highlights the term “Sāmaµ” (personally, individually) which 
frequently qualifies knowledge in the Pāli Nikāyas, the early Buddhist literature, and 
emphasizes the fact that in early Buddhism, knowledge comes through experiencing for 
‘oneself’ and not indirectly by hearing it from some external source. With reference to 
the pre-Buddhist background, Jayatilleke remarks, “At a time when a statement would 
have appeared authoritative only if it was handed down by a long line of teachers, the 
Buddha emphasizes that he has seen it by himself…and that he is not saying so after 
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having heard from another recluse or brahmin”.24    However the Buddha claims that “he 
could instruct an honest and intelligent person to verify for himself what the Buddha has 
verified”. Jayatilleke tries to show the given emphasis of personal verification in the 
discussions of valid means of knowledge. He concludes that this emphasis can be found 
throughout the Pāli Nikāyas in trying to determine the ways of knowing.25 
 
Secondly, Jayatilleke notices the notion of verification in the procedure employed 
by Gautama Buddha prior to his enlightenment in arriving at the truth that he proclaims. 
The Pāli Nikāyas shows how the Buddha before his enlightenment engaged in a quest for 
the knowledge of freedom. As Jayatilleke summarizes, the Buddha in his young age 
renounced household life and seriously involved himself in a noble search (ariya 
pariyesana). He seemed to have tried out the various methods practiced by both orthodox 
and unorthodox practitioners. He seemed to have employed the techniques of yoga. 
Certain yoga practices such as stopping the breath with the idea of curbing the mind are 
recorded. He experimented with various ascetic practices of the Ājivakas and the Jains 
such as penance (tapassi), self-mortification (lËkha), avoidance (jeguccha), and seclusion 
(paviveka). He engaged in extreme practices of non-violence and followed some ascetics 
who believed that emancipation resulted from eating a special kind of food and from 
gradually reducing the act of eating to the point of starvation. He would have undertaken 
these experimental practices during the period of his training under Ālāra kālāma and 
Uddaka rāmaputta, who were prominent teachers at that time and during the subsequent 
six years of severe austerity. With “an empirical basis in his own experience” the Buddha 
                                                 







proclaimed the futility of these practices and concluded that neither addiction to sense-
pleasure nor addiction to the self-torturing practice tend to produce knowledge and 
insight. Without being caught up in either of these extremes, the Buddha followed the 
middle path and with his own effort he attained enlightenment. He then declared that this 
enlightenment or emancipating knowledge is to be attained as the final phase of a 
personal training process.26 Jayatilleke is impressed with the Buddha’s experimental 
quest and he wants us to believe that “early Buddhism should therefore be regarded not 
as a system of metaphysics but as a verifiable hypothesis discovered by the Buddha in the 
course of his ‘trial and error’ experimentation with different ways of life”.27  
 
Thirdly, Jayatilleke finds the notion of “verifiability” in the doctrines of early 
Buddhism. As he establishes “personal verification” as a valid means of knowledge 
accepted in early Buddhism, its doctrines are invariably, he declares, “verifiable”. He 
asserts, “The Buddha’s religion is personally verifiable in this life…”28 Jayatilleke claims 
that the term “sacchikaroti” that often appears in the Buddhist doctrines is to be taken as 
‘verify’. He points out this verification is based on empirical evidences of both normal 
and extrasensory perception. He, however, takes only the specific extrasensory abilities 
called ‘abhiññå’ as extrasensory perception in this context without paying attention to 
other forms of higher knowledge recognized in early Buddhism. 
 
Jayatilleke’s ascription of verifiability to the doctrines of early Buddhism is 
primarily based on his interpretation of the role of Saddhā (faith, confidence). He 
                                                 
26 EBTK 465-466 
27 EBTK 464 






identifies three aspects of saddhā, namely the affective, the conative and the cognitive.29 
The affective aspect of saddhā represents one’s appreciation and satisfaction towards a 
person or a teaching. The confidence and the energetic feeling associated with saddhā is 
the conative aspect. The cognitive aspect is the characteristic of saddhā as a resultant of 
an investigation.   Jayatilleke focuses on the cognitive aspect of saddhā. He convincingly 
shows that what is valued in early Buddhism is the rational characteristic of saddhā that 
is a prerequisite of the process of verifying the doctrines. He refers to a distinction of 
saddhā made in the texts and calls them i) Baseless faith (amulikā saddhā) and ii) 
Rational faith (ākāravati saddhā). The first type, which has the connotation of devotion 
and affection, is shown as not important in the early Buddhist scheme. What is valued is 
the second type, which is in contrast with the first type. Jayatilleke considers this type of 
saddhā as “a product of critical examination and partial verification”.30 In this context, 
according to Jayatilleke, saddhā signifies “ the provisional acceptance of a proposition or 
doctrine for the purpose of verification”.31 The actual provisional acceptance is made 
only after a rigorous examination. As such saddhā, to Jayatilleke, is not similar to “faith” 
as understood in theistic religions. Saddhā qualifies an initial but crucial stage of the 
process of personal verification.  However Jayatilleke considers that although saddhā is 
important in the process of verification it is insufficient for the full realization and it 
should be completely replaced by paññā (wisdom) at the end.32  
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Jayatilleke shows us that the Buddhist doctrine of Karma (causal relationship 
between volitional actions and their consequences) can be verified with the help of 
clairvoyance (dibbacakkhu), which is one of the abhññiās. This ability is directed 
towards gaining knowledge of the deceased and survival of beings and understanding the 
working of Karma. As Jayatilleke extracts from the text, with this clairvoyance one can 
see “beings dying and being reborn, the low and high, fair and ugly, each according to 
one’s karma”.33  
 
The Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination or Buddhist theory of causality, for 
Jayatilleke, is not subjective and is not a category imposed by the mind on phenomena. 
That is a causal sequence or concomitance that occurs independently of us and all we do 
is to discover this. The Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination merely reveals this 
objective pattern of phenomena. Whether the Buddha discovers and teaches it or not, the 
pattern of dependent origination exists. What the Buddha does is that he “discovers it, 
points it out, lays it down, reveals it, analyses it, clarifies it and says ‘look’”.34 In his view 
this doctrine does not posit a metaphysical notion but a regular pattern of phenomena that 
can be observed with a careful mind. Therefore one’s discovery of “dependent 
origination” is based on empirical investigation. Jayatilleke comments, “The Buddhist 
theory is therefore empirical since it spoke only of observable causes without any 
metaphysical pre-suppositions of any substrata behind them”.35 For him this doctrine 
even closely resembles Hume’s Regularity theory except for the apparent empirical 
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necessity of the causal sequence in the Buddhist theory.36 In Hume’s theory all inductive 
inferences on causal sequences are merely probable and the theory posits that there is no 
“empirical necessities” in causation. Causation is an illusion of impression, a product of 
habit and expectation. Nevertheless, according to early Buddhism causality is a necessary 
process. Early Buddhism does not see ‘things’ and ‘events’ as discrete and static 
phenomenon.  Things and events are in a real sense processes with causal power. 
Causality is said to be “necessity” (avitathatā) in early Buddhism “since there is no 
failure even for a moment to produce events which arise when conditions come 
together”.37  
 
The Four Noble Truths, which constitute the principal doctrine of early Buddhism 
are also shown as verifiable by Jayatilleke. He refers to a textual explanation, which 
reads: one comprehends the noble truths and sees them. For Jayatilleke comprehension 
and seeing means verification. He even claims that ‘the method of verification of the 
Four Noble Truths’ is stated clearly in the texts.38 Even Nirvana, which comes under this 
doctrine, is regarded by him as a state to be seen or verified “in a sense analogous to the 
seeing of a man born blind after a physician has treated him”.39 
 
Finally, Jayatilleke recognizes the verifiability principle in his treatment of the 
“concept of meaninglessness” in the Pāli Nikāyas. He claims that the Buddha has referred 
to statements of a certain character as “lacking in meaning or is meaningless” 
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(appa ih¥rakatam) and statements of the opposite character as “meaningful” 
(sappa ih¥rakatam).40 In the beginning Jayatilleke shows that according to the early 
Buddhist point of view, expressions containing words which do not stand for anything 
would be meaningless statements. According to him the standard example of 
“meaningless statement” is the following.41 
 
“I like and am in love with the beauty queen of this country”. 
 
It appears that the expression ‘the beauty queen of this country’ should have a 
reference or in other words should have someone answering to the description for the 
above statement to be meaningful. He examines the ambiguity of this kind of definite 
description and shows that there may or may not be instances, which fulfill this definite 
description. In an instance in which we are in a country where no one has been accepted 
or named as ‘the beauty queen of this country’, one’s claim, ‘I love the beauty queen of 
this country’, seems extremely odd. Because the expression ‘the beauty queen of this 
country’ does not stand for anything.  
 
Jayatilleke thinks that early Buddhism has a relativist criterion of meaning. He 
further analyzes the above discussion in the Pāli Nikāyas and shows that although the 
term, ‘the beauty queen of this country’ has a denotation, still such a statement can be 
meaningless under certain conditions. He says, “…it would be seen that context can 
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render such a statement meaningless”.42 In this case in a context in which the person who 
makes this statement confesses that he does not know any feature or particulars of this 
beauty queen such as her personal name, her family, her physical appearance etc., the 
above statement becomes meaningless. He succinctly puts the argument thus: 
 
X’s statement ‘I love Y’ is meaningless since (i) one is not sure whether there is 
an instance of Y, and (ii) even if there is, it does not make sense for X to say that 
he loves Y unless he has some acquaintance direct or indirect with Y, such that he 
could specify at least one of the characteristics of Y… 
  
Jayatilleke wants to show that in early Buddhist viewpoint, a statement becomes 
meaningless if there is no verifiable content to the statement from the point of view of the 
one who is making it.  As Jayatilleke interprets, in early Buddhist viewpoint a statement 
is meaningful if it is verifiable in principle by the person who makes it though it is not 
verified actually.  
 
He examines three other contexts of Pāli Nikāys in which this issue is discussed. 
Those discussions deal with the theistic belief in God and metaphysical belief in soul. In 
one case an example is given that a person makes a stairway in a public square to reach a 
mansion.43 When asked he is unable to describe where the mansion is or to give any 
account of it. Here ‘mansion’ is analogous to belief in Brahma (God) and the stairway is 
analogous to the straight path leading to companionship with Brahma. In this case the 
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statements, ‘one makes a staircase to a mansion’ and ‘there is a straight path to the 
companionship with Brahma’ are meaningless since the utterer can attach no meaning or 
verification to the terms, ‘mansion’ and ‘Brahma’. In another context the claims made by 
other thinkers on the soul and the status after death are also considered meaningless as 
they cannot attach any verifiable content to the concepts in the statements. In another 
occasion a person named Udāyi, in a discussion with the Buddha, refers to ‘the highest 
colour’ (the highest splendor). When he is asked what is the highest colour he answers, 
‘that colour than which there is no other colour, which is higher or better is the highest 
colour’. In early Buddhist viewpoint this explanation does not specify ‘the highest 
colour’ but merely repeats its definition. ‘No meaning by way of anything verifiable is 
attached to the phrase ‘highest colour’ in this context.’44 Therefore it is meaningless. 
 
In Jayatilleke’s treatment of verification, resemblance of the early Buddhist 
account to the positivistic verifiability criterion of meaning emerges. It is to this 
connection that he draws the reader’s attention. In the case of the example of ‘Brahma’ 
(God), the statement is considered meaningless, since no meaning or verification is 
attached by those who make it to the term, ‘Brahma’. In the case of the example of the 
soul after death the statement is considered meaningless “because those who make 
it…can attach no verifiable content to the statement or to the concepts in it”.45 The 
statement, “that colour than which there is no other colour which is higher or better is the 
highest colour” is said to be meaningless because what is meant by ‘the highest colour’ is 
not specified. In all the above cases, according to Jayatilleke, early Buddhist concept of 
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meaninglessness resembles the positivist verifiability criterion of meaning. He claims, 
“Pāli Nikāyas seem to be saying that a statement in which no verification or meaning is 
attached to one of its terms (by the speaker) is in fact meaningless”.46    
 
However Jayatilleke also notes two differences between early Buddhist and the 
positivist criteria of meaning. In the positivist account, a statement is meaningful if it is in 
principle verifiable but verification is solely in respect of (normal) sense experience 
whereas early Buddhism admits extrasensory experience as well. The other difference is 
that the positivist criterion of verifiability makes no reference to the speakers and the 
contexts of the statements. Conversely early Buddhism assigns meaningfulness to the 
statements with reference to speakers and the contexts in which they were uttered. 
Accordingly, in early Buddhism a statement can be meaningless relatively but not 
intrinsically. Thus Jayatilleke proposes that early Buddhism has a relative criterion of 
meaningfulness.       
                                                                 
Jayatilleke’s investigation into the early strata of Buddhist literature and his 
treatment of the notion of personal verification ends with an empiricist interpretation of 
early Buddhism. His analysis of epistemological issues found in early Buddhism points to 
‘direct personal experience’ as valid knowledge and argues that ‘personal verification’ is 
a valid means of knowledge. These claims have convinced him to liken the approach of 
early Buddhism to that of empiricism: 
 
                                                 






  “The emphasis that ‘knowing (jāna◊) must be based on ‘seeing’ (passa◊) or 
direct perceptive experience, makes Buddhism a form of Empiricism.”47 
 
With his suggested empiricist outlook of early Buddhism, Jayatilleke does not 
attempt to see any other distinct features of early Buddhist theory of knowledge than 
adding extrasensory perception to the sphere of experience. He believes that the use of 
the term, ‘empiricism’ can justifiably be extended to cover the early Buddhist analysis of 
knowledge. 
 
1.4 Hoffman’s Critique 
 
This empiricist interpretation of early Buddhism has been criticized mainly by 
Frank J Hoffman.48 The notion of verification that Jayatilleke recognizes in the early 
Buddhist theory of knowledge is considered as illegitimate and exaggerated in Hoffman’s 
critique. He adduces reasons from both emic (internal)49 and etic (external)50 perspectives 
to refute empiricist interpretation of early Buddhism and alleged notion of verification.  
 
His critique is primarily based on the following considerations. 
1. The absence of a concept of proposition in early Buddhism.  
2. New interpretation of the role of saddhā (faith, confidence)  
3. New evaluation of a form of higher knowledge, abhiññā.  
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4. Arguing that a real notion of verification is impossible in the early Buddhist 
context.  
   
Hoffman argues that there is no concept of proposition in early Buddhism. He 
analyses the meaning of the words, “sacca” and “miccha”, which are often translated as 
true and false respectively. He shows that those terms are used as properties of 
“utterances” not as properties of propositions. Hoffman makes a distinction between 
“utterances” and “proposition” as it is clear in his following statement.  
 
Utterances, unlike propositions or thoughts, may be soft or loud, said in haste or 
in a drawl, made in a cubicle or in a theatre at a certain time, etc. whereas none of 
these are true of propositions or of thoughts in the same sense.51   
 
Hoffman seems to maintain that “propositions” have an independent existence 
from utterances. He claims that early Buddhism does not offer such a technical 
distinction between propositions and utterances. Moreover Hoffman seems to be striving 
to seek an equivalent term for “proposition” in the Pāli Nikāyas. He notices that although 
there are terms to mark a distinction between “intentional thoughts” and “utterances”, one 
finds “no occurrences in early Buddhism of the term for proposition”. Even fourfold logic 
employed in early Buddhist literature, according to Hoffman, are heuristic rules to be 
applied to “utterances” not to propositions.52 
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           Saddhā (faith, confidence) is seen, in Jayatilleke’s treatise, as an initial and crucial 
stage of the process of personal verification. Hoffman offers a different interpretation of 
saddhā and argues against the role of saddha in verification as deemed by Jayatilleke. As 
we saw earlier, Jayatilleke emphasized the rational character of saddhā by showing that 
saddhā is always a consequence of the examination of statements made by the Buddha. 
Then ‘the faith’ that followers have in the Buddha is none other than ‘faith’ in the teacher 
as a result of ‘faith’ in the teaching. In other words, saddhā in the Buddha is subsequent 
to checking the truth of what he teaches and therefore it qualifies as a stage of 
verification. In contrast, Hoffman shows with textual evidence that there are instances 
where saddhā precedes one’s checking and understanding of the doctrine. Therefore 
saddhā loses its a posteriori quality with which Jayatilleke invests rational character in it. 
Hoffman points out “there is an affective element in saddhā, which is ignored if one 
treats believing in the Buddha as equivalent to believing that what he says is true.”53 As 
saddhā is in many cases affective and prior to understanding the doctrine, Hoffman 
concludes that saddhā indeed facilitates one’s understanding of what the Buddha teaches. 
saddhā is the ground, which justifies the beliefs of early Buddhism.        
 
              Hoffman then proceeds to examine one of the forms of higher knowledge in 
early Buddhism, abhiññā.54 This form of higher knowledge is treated in Jayatilleke’s 
treatise as a device of personal verification. Hoffman argues against the view of abhiññå 
as an epistemological ground in verifying doctrines of early Buddhism. According to him 
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abhiññå cannot be considered as experiences, which supply evidences to verify or to 
confirm the doctrines of early Buddhism, but should be understood as informed by 
doctrinal assumptions. They are meaningful only in the context of other doctrinal 
assumptions. Experiences of abhiññā may be viewed as part of the background against 
which other beliefs in early Buddhism are seen as true by believers.  Moreover they are 
embodied in religious practices. Therefore abhiññå does not “verify” any objective facts 
as in empirical sciences. In addition “religious discovery” is largely what investigator 
brings with him to the search. Hoffman comments:  
 
…it is a mistake to think that there is a body of propositions which can be 
rightly labeled ‘religious knowledge’, in a sense even remotely analogous to 
scientific knowledge. Unlike ‘religious knowledge’, there may indeed be 
‘religious wisdom’, but if there is, it is to be found embodied in the lives of 
religious people, and as with ‘philosophical wisdom’, cannot be defined in a set 
of propositions but is embodied in practices.55 
 
Hoffman strongly argues against the verifiability of doctrines of early Buddhism. 
He asserts that falsifiability in principle is necessary for the meaning of verifiability and 
early Buddhism simply does not have this criterion. Hoffman has formulated his 
argument based on Karl Popper’s view. Popper popularized the view that science should 
proceed by way of conjecture and refutation. The bolder and riskier is the knowledge the 
better it is. “ It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every 
                                                 






theory―if we look for confirmations….A theory which is not refutable by any 
conceivable event is non scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of theory (as people often 
think) but a vice”.56   Hoffman following this line of argument shows that the doctrines of 
early Buddhism are not falsifiable in principle and consequently they are not verifiable 
either. Hoffman illustrates with his “parable of bhikkhu”57 that there is no possibility, in 
principle, for an investigator to falsify the doctrine. In a case that a monk (bhikkhu) 
meditates earnestly for a period of time and yet fails to acquire “knowledge and vision of 
rebirth”, it is not accepted that he has falsified the doctrine of rebirth.  Hoffman further 
comments,  
 
Although the doctrine is a ‘come and see’ doctrine it will not be falsified by the 
assiduous meditating monk who meditates and yet does not ‘see’ rebirth (one of 
the doctrines of early Buddhism)…at no point will meditation teacher agree that 
the student has falsified the doctrine in case the student come and not see.58   
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basis for interpretation. The skeptical bhikkhu thinks: I have had many experiences of meditating without 
acquiring knowledge and vision of rebirth, for example. So, if the teacher will not allow that any of my 
experience counts against the rebirth doctrine, then I do not see how anything could count for it either. If 
you can’t falsify it, then you can’t verify it either. See “The Buddhist Empiricism Thesis”, in Religious 
Studies, Vol. 18, no. 2 June 1982, pp 154-155  







The upshot of Hoffman’s above discussion basically is that the nature of “verification” 
acknowledged in early Buddhism is that of a “religious experience” (in the Western 
theistic religious sense of the term), which cannot be verified or falsified empirically. 
   
With these observations Hoffman argues that early Buddhism has no “notion of 
verification” in the strict sense of western empiricism. Firstly, early Buddhism lacks the 
concept of proposition, which is essential for verification. Secondly saddhā 
(“confidence”, “faith”) and abhiññā (“higher modes of knowledge”), which were 
considered important means of personal verification in Jayatilleke’s treatise, are 
inadequate to sustain the notion of verification. The role of saddhā, in many cases, is a 
priori faith and not “subsequent to checking”.  Experiences of abhññā are involved with 
doctrinal assumption and embodied in the lives of religious people. Thirdly, since there is 
no possibility in early Buddhist context for a truth seeker to falsify the doctrine, one 
cannot admit a justifiable notion of verification in early Buddhism. 
 
There is no basis for going further to say that these faculties verify [the doctrines 
of early Buddhism, such as] rebirth and action in the strong, usual empiricist 
sense of ‘verify’ according to which falsification must be in principle possible59 
 
  Hoffman brings his arguments from the viewpoint of philosophy of religion. In 
this view, verifying or falsifying a belief solely depends on whether one is a believer or a 
                                                 






non-believer. It is not an issue that can be solved objectively. With this approach he 
reckons that the alleged early Buddhist notion of verification is not experimental. 
Religious beliefs do not ‘wax or wane’ with (empirical) evidences. Early Buddhism 
cannot undermine this entailment. Beliefs or doctrines of early Buddhism cannot be 
regarded as appropriate only so far as it is supported by evidence. Hoffman deems that 
the nature of verification appropriate to Buddhism is that of a religious experience in the 
sense analogous to that of Western theistic religions. He compares the enlightenment 
experience of the Buddha and St. Paul’s Damascus experience. With the help of 
Sutherland’s view on religious experiences60 he equates the enlightenment experience 
and the Damascus experience as both experiences involve a change in beliefs.61 
According to Hoffman, abhiññā and other meditative experiences can only be explained 
with reference to the beliefs in early Buddhism and they can not provide evidence which 
can be used to verify or falsify the beliefs in early Buddhism.62  
 
 
                                                 
60 Steward R. Sutherland, “St. Paul’s Damascus Experience” in Sophia Vol. 14, 1975, p. 15 
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Limitations of Two Interpretations 
 
Jayatilleke offers a comprehensive analysis of the epistemological issues found in 
early Buddhism and highlights the common aspects of early Buddhist analysis with 
empiricism. Hoffman critiques Jayatilleke’s interpretation and demonstrates the 
possibility of understanding the early Buddhist notion of verification in a context of 
religious belief. Both interpretations reveal certain aspects of the early Buddhist notion of 
verification but seem to fail to grasp the full significance of it. Due to their over emphasis 
on certain aspects of the notion and overdependence on the categories of Western 
philosophy and Western concept of religion, both interpretations remarkably overlook the 
deconstructive nature of the early Buddhist notion of verification.  
 
In this chapter I will show the limitations of Jayatilleke’s interpretation and 
Hoffman’s critique. I will argue that early Buddhism maintains a constructivist position 
which contradicts Jayatilleke’s empiricist interpretation of the early Buddhist notion of 
verification. I will show Jayatilleke’s failure to notice the deconstructive nature of the 
early Buddhist notion of verification. Then I will show Hoffman’s underestimation of the 
experiential aspect of the notion. Further I will show Hoffman’s generalization of early 
Buddhist verification with “religious experience” in the popular sense and his failure to 







2.1 Critique of Jayatilleke’s Interpretation 
 
  Jayatilleke’s treatment of early Buddhist analysis of knowledge seems to be a 
faithful presentation of the Pāli Nikāya texts. Jayatilleke correctly grasps and presents the 
essential characteristics of early Buddhism and, particularly, he identifies the experiential 
aspect of the early Buddhist notion of verification. He shows the early Buddhist critique 
of “traditional authority (anussava)” and “mere reasoning (takka)” as valid ground of 
knowledge and exemplifies the primacy of experience that is evident in the early 
Buddhist notion of verification. Based on this explicit emphasis on experience Jayatilleke 
considers the early Buddhist notion of verification as akin to empiricism.  
 
  It is extremely important, in the act of comparing, to see the limits of similarity.  
However Jayatilleke’s interpretation of the early Buddhist notion of verification seems to 
put an extra emphasis on the compatibility with empirical and positivist approaches to 
knowledge. Over emphasizing of this apparent aspect of early Buddhist analysis would 
lead the reader to ignore other important features of it. Without seeing the other important 
features, which go beyond the similarities with Western empiricism, one is not able to 
grasp the uniqueness of the early Buddhist notion of verification, that is, the 
deconstructive nature of it.  
Jayatilleke uses the term “verify” within the early Buddhist context for the 
meaning of “direct perceptive experience”. First he seems to take the early Buddhist 






differentiations.63 Firstly, verification in early Buddhism, unlike in logical empiricism, 
makes reference to the subject and the context of experience.64 Secondly, verification is 
based on both ordinary sensory experience and extrasensory experience. The 
extrasensory experience in Jayatilleke’s treatise means the particular extrasensory 
abilities referred to by the term, abhiññā. Abhiññā in this context of Jayatilleke’s 
treatment means broadening the range of normal sense organs through mental 
development.65 Experiences that we receive from both normal and extrasensory abilities 
are ultimately sensory data, i.e. visual forms, sounds and so on. However “verify”, for 
him, means to have direct perceptual acquaintance. With this treatment of verification he 
arrives at his conclusion that the grounding knowledge on “direct perceptive experience” 
makes early Buddhism a form of empiricism.66  
It is worth pausing here to consider what Jayatilleke means by the term 
“empiricism.” Given the variety of versions of this term with regard to the classical 
empiricist tradition, we have to be sure which sense is referred to in Jayatilleke’s 
interpretation. In his discussion, he does not clearly point to a particular empiricist 
philosopher or a particular version of empiricism. And although he does mention David 
Hume’s theory on several occasions, he does not seem to liken any particular version to 
the early Buddhist position.  
                                                 
63 EBTK 331 
64 Early Buddhism is interested not in verifiability in principle but in actual verification by the individual.    
65 Jayatilleke takes the term, abhiññā only to mean the six extrasensory abilities that are often referred to in 
early Buddhist discourses. He refers particularly to “the knowledge of recollection of past lives 
(pubbenivāsānussati ñāˆa)” and “the clairvoyance (dibbacakkhu)” as means of verification. This is a 
restricted sense of the term, abhiññā.  This study gives a broader interpretation to abhiññā which is more 
helpful in recognizing the deconstructive nature of the early Buddhist notion of verification.  






Empiricism in its general sense can be taken as a theory that the [five] senses are 
the basis of all knowledge. “…The weak form of empiricism can be generalized into the 
thesis that all knowledge comes from experience [of five senses].”67  I think that in his 
interpretation, Jayatilleke has the general notion of empiricism in his mind and not a 
particular version or philosopher in the British empiricist tradition. He uses the term 
‘empiricism’ not in the restricted sense of referring to a particular version of empiricism, 
but in the general sense of the term.68 As such, his interpretation has to be understood in 
the weak sense of empiricism.  
Even according to the weak sense of empiricism, perceptive experience or sense 
data are basically traces impressed on the mind by the five senses. They are part and 
parcel of human knowledge received without an intervention of any other faculty of 
human personality. Empiricism assumes that sense impressions can be imprinted in the 
mind without being subjected to one’s beliefs and subjective tendencies in all cases. Thus 
sense data deserve ultimate evidential status.  
However, I argue that early Buddhism is not in agreement with empiricism in this 
regard. It does not accept the possibility of having experiences unadulterated by the 
internal factors of the individual in all cases. Perceptive or sensory experience, in early 
Buddhist view, is a conscious construct in the case of ordinary person, that is, sensory 
experience is constructed by the subject based on the conceptual framework of the mind. 
The whole process is a complicated one, starting from initial sense contact and sensation, 
                                                 
67 “Empiricism” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy .p 499 
68 Jayatilleke refers to the definition of the term, empiricism in Rune’s Dictionary of Philosophy (London: 
1945) which describes that empiricism holds “that the sole source of knowledge is experience…. Experi-
ence may be understood as either all conscious content, data of the senses only or other designated con-






proceeding through various degrees of discrimination and reasoning towards conceptual 
proliferations and ending with emotional reactions. As such, sensory experience is not a 
trace left upon in the mind by the five senses. It is actively constructed and fashioned by 
the inner sense, the mind. As such it is clear that early Buddhism maintains a 
constructivist position with regard to sensory knowledge, that is, early Buddhism holds 
sensory experience not as a passive record of external stimuli but as that which actively 
organized and constructed by the subject based on the conceptual framework of the mind. 
This constructivist position as maintained in early Buddhism challenges the empiricist 
interpretation of the early Buddhist notion of verification. In empiricist accounts sensory 
experience is something that is received by the subject through the five senses whereas in 
early Buddhism sensory experience is something that is actively constructed by the 
subject. It is arguable whether early Buddhism can be considered ‘empiricist’ in the 
strong sense of the term. It is true that both empiricism and early Buddhism treat ‘sensory 
experience’ as the basis of our knowledge. Nevertheless, the evaluation of sensory 
experience in early Buddhism marks a radical departure from empiricist treatment of the 
same. It is important at this point to see how early Buddhism analyses the process of 
sensory knowledge.  
 
2.1.1 The Process of Sensory Knowledge  
 
The sensory process is presented in the Pāli Nikāyas as a dependently arisen and 
conditionally moving process. Sensory experience begins when certain conditions are 






Certain prerequisites for a sensory awareness to arise are given in the Maha 
hattipadomapa Sutta.69 
 
1. Intact internal sense organs with fair degree of maturity.  
2. Appearance of relevant sense-objects.  
3. The sense-object’s falling within the range of the internal sense-organ.  
4. Conscious engagement on the meeting of them. 
 
The third condition implies that each sense-organ has its own range and each is 
with its limit. In addition, although an object comes within the full range of a sense-
organ, there will not be any sensory awareness unless ‘conscious engagement’ or initial 
mental attention on their meeting is employed. For example, a sound may come into 
contact with the ear but unless ‘conscious engagement’ is employed on that contact a full 
sensory awareness of that sound will not arise. We selectively employ our ‘conscious 
engagement’ on sense objects that come into the ranges of our senses. When these 
conditions are fulfilled corresponding consciousness (eye consciousness, ear 
consciousness etc.) arises. This is the basic sensory awareness. The corresponding 
consciousness (viññāna) serves as the basis for the development of sensory process. 
Subsequently, the initial sense data of the corresponding consciousness flow through 
different levels of cognition as a process.  
 
The whole explanation of the arising of sensory awareness as interdependent 
process is explained in an impersonal mode. When the relevant factors meet in the proper 
                                                 






way there arises sensory awareness. Consequently any reference to a metaphysical 
substance such as Atman behind the process is absent in the early Buddhist accounts. Not 
only the arising of sensory awareness but also the development of the sensory knowledge 
is presented as an interdependent process. Analayo observes: “The conditionality of the 
perceptual process is a central feature of early Buddhist analysis of subjective 
experience.” 70 After the initial sensory awareness the sensory process flows as sequences 
of causal conditions.  
 
Among several accounts of the process of sensory knowledge, the following is 
considered as standard.  
 
(a) Depending on the eye and visible form there arises visual consciousness. 
Coming together of these three is contact. With contact as condition feeling 
(sensation) arises; (b) what one feels, one perceives; what one perceives, one 
reflects upon; what one reflects upon, one mentally proliferates; (c) due to that, 
conception and notions tinged  by mental proliferation, assail the individual in 
respect to past, future and present forms cognizable through the eye.  71 
 
This short passage guides us to define the early Buddhist epistemological position. In the 
beginning of the process we can see that neither external object nor internal sense organ 
(the subject) is predominant in the process. Both sense organ and the object are given 
                                                 
70 Analayo Bhikkhu, Satipa††hāna (Birmingham, Windhorse Publications, 2003) p. 142 






equal importance. They are dependent on each other. The whole sensory process is 
dependent on the sense organ and the object.  
 
The above passage describes the ordinary flow of sensory process. The process 
flows as sequences of causal conditions starting from the initial step of the mind’s 
involvement with the external world and culminating with the manifestation of 
conceptual proliferation (papañca).  In this connection, Ñāˆananda’s analysis of the 
above passage throws some light onto early Buddhist theory. It correctly reveals three 
significant stages of the development of the ordinary sensory process.72 Shifts in 
grammatical structure of the passage help to identify these three successive stages. The 
verbal forms of the passage changes three times. Ñāˆananda following three shifts of 
grammatical structure of the passage identifies three successive stages of the sensory 
process.  
 
The first stage (a), till the arising of feeling (sensation), appears in an impersonal 
mode. This initial stage naturally occurs when the relevant factors are available. The 
early account that we have discussed deals elaborately with these relevant factors. This 
stage explains how external objects come into contact with internal sense organs and 
produce the initial sense experience.  
 
In the second stage (b), the perceiver is actively involved in the process. At the 
point of ‘feeling (sensation)’ the verbal forms of the passage changes from impersonal 
mood to third person verbs and reads: “what one feels. One perceives; what one 
                                                 






perceives, one reflects upon; what one reflects upon, one mentally proliferates”. 
Ñāˆananda suggests that third person endings of the verbs employed here imply 
deliberate activities of the perceiver. This is the second stage where the individual or the 
subject deliberately engages in organizing the sensory experience. Several important 
events of manifestation of sensory experience come under this stage. The subject’s initial 
response to a given sensory object, which is termed ‘sanjānāti’ does not stand for mere 
passive recognition of the object but refers to active subjective recognition of the object. 
This subjective recognition is influenced by one’s emotional inclinations and conceptual 
framework. It does not refer to a specific manner of cognizing and it does not represent 
any indelible Forms or structure in the Platonic sense. This initial sensory response is a 
complex process and it can take many directions. It depends on the way one is used to 
respond. With this habitual way of thinking one continuously constructs inclinations and 
conceptual frameworks. The following cognitive events, which are termed as vitakka and 
papañca, signify complex prolific activities in ideation. Vitakka refers to the initial 
application of reasoning about the conception of the sense-object. It is the bringing of the 
sense-object into prominence for further reasoning. It is suggested that this act of 
reasoning closely follows one’s language. Therefore vitakka presupposes the language 
and acts as a subvocal linguistic medium. Then the subsequent cognitive event, papañca 
refers to the mental proliferation of the conceived sensory object. The etymology of the 
word, papañca conveys such meanings as ‘spreading out’, ‘expansion’, and 
‘manifoldness’.73  The term implies the expanding of conceptual activity through 
                                                 






various channels. It refers to the conceptual manifestation in the realm of ideation.74 The 
sensory process actively flows through various channels of mental manifestation. In this 
stage there is no more need of further external stimulation for the sensory process to flow 
and it is driven with internal agitation.       
 
In the last stage (c), interestingly the sensory process overwhelms the subject. The 
net result of sensory experience becomes the governing part of the subject. In the 
grammatical structure of this passage, the individual who is the subject of experience 
appears as the object of the sensory process. The nett result of this process creates 
habitual tendencies within the individual and in turn they come into play in the 
individual’s subsequent sensory experiences. These products of the sensory process are 
termed ‘ papañca saññā sankhā’, which is interpreted as ‘ concepts characterized by the 
mind’s prolific tendency’.75 These ‘concepts’ are traced in human personality and 
crucially affect the organization of one’s sensory experience. Thus the subject is led by 
the ‘concepts’. 
 
The sensory process is further described in other discourses showing further stages 
of the process. For example, the Discourse on the Root of Existence (the MËlapariyāya 
Sutta) explores the sensory process quite similarly to the early account but adds a further 
stage.  
                                                 
74 The verb, Maññāti and the word Maññanā which occur in other discourses also refer to the same 
constructive activity of subjective imagination. (See the MËlapariyāya Sutta, M I 1). Bhikkhu Bodhi 
observes that vitakka is a neural term which may involve either a right or a wrong grasp of its object while 
maññānā signifies a more developed activity that always involves a wrong grasp of the object. See The 
Root of Existence (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1992 2nd Ed.) p.6    







         He perceives (sañjānāti) the seen (sense object) as the seen. Having perceived the 
seen as the seen, he imagines (maññati) the seen [in various ways]…he imagines 
the seen to be mine, he delights in the seen (abhinandati).76 
 
         The word, ‘delights’ represents the emotive response of the individual to the 
sensory environment. Based on conceptualization and proliferation of the sense object, 
one ends up with emotional gratification over it. It seems that emotions, which covertly 
influence the early stages of the sensory process, come to operate quite prominently at 
this stage. This stage of emotional responses in the sensory process is explicitly shown in 
the following account. 
 
Engaged as he is in favoring and opposing, whatever feelings he feels- 
whether pleasant or painful or neither pleasant nor painful- he delights in that 
feeling, welcomes it and remains holding to it.77 
 






                                                 
76 M. I. 1 & The Middle Length Discourse of the Buddha, B.P.S. Kandy, 1995-p.83 
77 M I 267  & The Middle Length Discourse of the Buddha, B.P.S. Kandy, 1995-p.359 















What is clear is that Early Buddhism does not consider the mind as a “blank 
sheet’, a tabula rasa, in the sensory process. It is not a passive receiver of sense data but 
an active organizer and interpreter. Not only is the mind actively involved in organizing 
the initial sense impressions, it also engages itself in discernments, manifestations, 
categorization and contextualization of sense experiences. As such, sense data are under 
continuous editorial revision of the mind. Early Buddhism clearly elucidates the mind’s 
engagement in constructing ‘concepts’ (saññā) out of sense experience. Those concepts 
are applied when the mind recognizes new sense objects. Again these concepts are 
conditioned by new sense experiences. Since each new experience leaves some impact on 
the subject, the conceptual framework determining our experience, keeps re-forming. 
Thus in the Buddhist point of view, the mind plays an active role in sensory experiences 
and the whole scenario is a dynamic process. It seems that early Buddhism maintains a 
constructivist position regarding sensory experience, that is to say that sensory experience 






subject. Sensory experience, as early Buddhism holds, is largely a construction on the 
part of the subject. According to this constructivist position, the individual or the subject 
constructs his sensory experience out of initial raw sensations based on his conceptual 
framework. One’s sensory experience is structured according to the conceptual 
framework of the mind, which in turn re-forms with new experiences.  John Pickering 
remarks, “in line with the constructivist position, Buddhist psychology implies that, 
rather than being a passive record of cognitive mechanisms, the contents of 
consciousness are actively fashioned. Conscious experience is a construct not a trace.”79  
 
2.1.2 Contrast between Early Buddhism and Empiricism  
 
Given this constructivist position of early Buddhism regarding sensory 
knowledge, it is arguable whether one can appropriately define the early Buddhist 
verification with strict reference to empiricism. However, it should be noted here that 
even in empiricism it is accepted that a larger part of the content of our understanding or 
knowledge has been derived from certain constructions on the part of the mind. In 
Locke’s account, “sensations” of “primary qualities” in sense-objects subsequently lead 
one to recognize “secondary qualities”. These primary and secondary qualities cause one 
to have simple “ideas”. These simple “ideas” with their repetition and comparison form 
complex “ideas”.80 In Hume’s account, “impressions” form mental copies of them, viz. 
                                                 
79 Asian Philosophy Vol. 5, No. 1, 1995,p.30 
80 “These simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by 
those two ways above mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection.  When understanding is once stored with 
these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, 
and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas”. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 






“simple ideas”. The association and interaction of “simple ideas” give rise to “complex 
ideas”.81 In these empiricist accounts the mind is passive in receiving sensations. Even 
the simple ideas are mere copies of the perceived objects. The mind in Locke’s view, for 
example, is like a “great mirror”. Interaction of simple ideas supports the mind to form 
complex ideas. The mind’s constructive participation in one’s understanding or 
knowledge is always minor in empiricist accounts, that is, the mind’s role in sensory 
experience is more or less passive. In Berkeley’s view, knowledge is entirely dependent 
on sensations and there can be no question whether sensations actually represent reality, 
as the existence of everything is a matter of its being perceived.82 Although everything 
depends on the mind for its existence, the mind has no constructive role regarding 
sensations other than making them “actual” by passively perceiving them.  
 
The mind’s involvement as a constructive faculty is more obvious in the early 
Buddhist account than in any other empiricist account. Early Buddhism recognizes the 
prominent constructive power of the mind. The mind plays a vital role in constructing 
one’s experience. The whole content of the mind influences the construction of one’s 
sensory experience. From the inception of sense impressions the mind is an interpreter 
rather than a receiver.  In empiricist accounts, for a formation of an “idea”, only the 
interaction of impressions and the imaginary power of mind are recognized. In early 
                                                 
81 “…all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.” An 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748/1965), Sec. 2 
“It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between different thoughts or ideas in the mind, and that, 
in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of 
method and regularity…a certain proof that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound one, were 
bound together by some universal principle…” An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
(1748/1965), Sec. 3 
82 “Their esse is percipi, nor it is possible they should have any existence out of the minds of thinking 
things which perceive them.” A Treatise Concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge (1710/1963) part 






Buddhist analysis, the formation of “ideas”, reasoning and conceptualization are complex 
events in the perceptual process, which allow many internal factors to be involved in the 
process. Initial sensory impressions are shot through with the influences of past 
experiences, dispositions, and tendencies of the perceiver and, consequently, ideas and 
concepts are formed.  In the early Buddhist viewpoint, one’s emotional aspects and non-
cognitive elements play a vital role in forming concepts and ideas. The process is 
complex and dynamic since with the influences of many non-cognitive factors the 
process can be manifested in multifarious ways. Early Buddhist accounts do not agree 
with this specific manner given in the empiricist accounts by which ideas are formed. It 
provides a more dynamic picture of the whole scenario of constructing one’s sense 
experience giving the mind a bigger role in forming human knowledge than it is seen in 
empiricist tradition.  
 
It can be seen that empiricism has an assumption that “ideas” can be broken 
down, without loss, into simple ones and also conversely, complex ideas can be 
reconstructed out of their constituents, i.e. simple ideas. This sort of reductionism is at 
play in empiricism.83 Early Buddhist accounts of knowledge show that construction of 
sensory knowledge is not mechanical as such. Complex ideas cannot easily be broken 
down to small parts without loss. It is also not possible to reconstruct them out of simple 
ideas merely combining them together. “Ideas” are constructed not in a mechanical way 
but in a creative way. The mind plays a creative role in forming sensory knowledge.   
According to early Buddhism there is no uniform manner in which sensory knowledge is 
constructed. A construction of sensory knowledge is determined and conditioned by 
                                                 






various factors of the human personality such as beliefs, emotions, and psychological 
tendencies. These factors constitute the conceptual framework of the subject. The insight 
into this complex and dynamic process of constructing one’s experience is crucial in 
identifying the unique notion of verification in early Buddhism.  
 
“Experience” in empiricism means data generated by the five senses. The mind is 
only a passive receiver of this data. But in early Buddhism the mind is not only a 
secondary receiver and an interpreter of impressions of the five senses, but also a separate 
sense organ in itself with its own sense objects. The early Buddhist analysis speaks of the 
“six senses” (sa¬āyatana). The mind (mano) is one of the six senses. In other words, the 
mind is not opposed to the five senses; they work in a complementary manner. The mind 
operates as another sense organ with the other common five senses. The mind has its own 
sense objects which is termed as “dhammā”. The dhammas which is translated as mental 
phenomena84, can mean here the conscious contents of the mind, which includes 
concepts, mental images, memories. However the role of the mind surpasses the role of a 
sense organ. The mind operates both as a separate sense organ and as the interpreter of 
the sensory data. Each of the common five senses has their respective sensory field and 
none can experience the sensory field of another. But the mind as the sixth sense is 
capable of experiencing all data of the other five senses as well.  The Mahāvedalla Sutta 
puts it, 
 
                                                 
84 As translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi. See The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, (London: Wisdom 






Friend, these five faculties [eye, ear, nose, tongue, body] each has a separate 
field, a separate domain…[they] have mind as their resort, and mind 
experiences their fields and domains.85   
 
However with the view that the mind is a sense organ alongside the common five 
senses, the act of reasoning, memory and reflection are also treated in the same manner as 
the sense data of the other sense doors. The mind’s thinking activity is not given any 
privileged status in sensory experience and is regarded as sharing the same impersonal 
status of the sense data of the other five sense doors. When the other sense doors do not 
provide any stimulus, the mind can act as a sense organ with its own sense objects, and 
consequently, the sensory process moves on. Then all the six senses are simply 
mechanisms for presenting stimuli for the sensory process. Some scholars have pointed 
out that recognizing the mind as the sixth sense seems to dissolve the absolute distinction 
between sense and reason on which the rationalist-empiricist distinction rests.86 
 
2.1.3 The overlooked aspect of the early Buddhist notion of verification 
 
 
With its constructivist position regarding sensory knowledge, early Buddhism 
does not give evidential validity to ordinary sense experience in its verification. It is 
interesting to note that early Buddhism is based on sensory experience for verification but 
does not solely rely on it. It is true that early Buddhism does not recognize any particular 
mysterious intuition or faculty, which may be used for verification. But at the same time 
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it does not give an ultimate validity to ordinary sensory experience. Even experiences 
received through extrasensory abilities (abhiññā) are ultimately sensory data, i.e. visual 
forms, sounds and so on and are considered in early Buddhism as still vulnerable to 
undergo conceptualization and misinterpretation.  
 
The early Buddhist notion of verification, in my view, is developed as based on 
the understanding of embeddedness of sensory experience. In the process of constructing 
sensory experience the subject undergoes the influences of one’s own conceptual 
framework. The conceptual framework of the subject allows both cognitive and non-
cognitive factors of human personality to come into play in his construction of sensory 
experience. Consequently sensory experience is embedded in subjective colourings, 
conceptual proliferations and so on. As such early Buddhism does not solely rely on 
sensory experience for verification unless these embedded layers of sensory experience 
are deconstructed. Thus the early Buddhist notion is deconstructive in nature while 
having an experiential outlook. It is deconstructive in the sense that it requires a 
deconstruction of embedded layers of experience. In other words, verification in early 
Buddhism has two important phases: having a direct sensory encounter and 
deconstructing the embedded layers of experience. The latter phase is very much unique 
to early Buddhism but unfortunately this aspect is overlooked in Jayatilleke’s 
interpretation of early Buddhist verification. This aspect of the early Buddhist notion of 
verification will be discussed in detail later.  
 







The criticism against Jayatilleke leveled by Hoffman focuses on demonstrating 
the characteristics of a religious belief87 in early Buddhism.  Early Buddhist verification 
does not have an empiricist or a positivist sense as it is a notion that works within a 
religious belief (in the sense analogous to Western theistic religions). Hoffman offers his 
arguments with an approach from philosophy of religion.88 Hoffman’s argument against 
Jayatilleke’s empiricist interpretation is successful in indicating the overweight given to 
the compatibility of the early Buddhist notion of verification with empiricism.  
Nevertheless his critique, in my judgment, underestimates the experiential aspect of early 
Buddhist verification and moreover his critique also fails to recognize the deconstructive 
nature of the notion. His interpretation of saddhā as a priori faith that justifies the beliefs 
of early Buddhism, underestimates the experiential aspect of the early Buddhist notion of 
verification. Then his treatment of abhiññā leads him to generalize the means of early 
Buddhist verification as analogous to “religious experiences” in Western theistic 
religions89 and by doing so he fails to recognize the deconstructive nature of the early 
Buddhist notion of verification. 
                                                 
87 Hoffman’s idea of “religious belief” is restricted to Western theistic religions. He claims that early 
Buddhism appears as analogous to “what we should call religion in the West”. (Emphasis added) RMEB 
p.4 
88 Here “philosophy of religion” means the discipline that was developed as a branch of Western 
philosophy in post Kantian era, which is distinctly different from theology. Philosophy of religion is 
defined as philosophical thinking about religious matters, that is, the philosophical study of religious 
beliefs, religious doctrines, religious arguments and religious history. See Collins J., The Emergence of 
Philosophy of Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), Merold Westphal, “The Emergence of 
Modern Philosophy of Religion” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, (ed.) Philip L. Quinn 
et.al.,(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997) pp. 111-117.  
89Hoffman wants to employ the methodology of philosophy of religion to examine early Buddhism. “There 
is a need for scholars to do for Buddhism and other religions what philosophers of religion have been doing 
for Christianity in presenting conceptual problems” (RMEB p.7).  Philosophy of religion has developed the 
methodology to examine the concepts that are generally found in Western theistic religions. Religious 
experience is one of phenomena that philosophy of religion examines. Hoffman relies on Stewart R. 







2.2.1 The Process of Samannesanā 
 
Hoffman’s misinterpretation of saddhā and underestimation of the experiential 
aspect of the notion of verification can be seen by analyzing the process of sammanesanā 
which is the early Buddhist method of examining or verifying a teaching before one 
accepts or follows it.90 The technical term, samannesanā is generally translated as 
“exhaustive and gradual search”.91 The etymology of the term renders the meaning, “a 
comprehensive and systematic investigation”.92   
 
Samannesanā lays down a procedure of personally verifying that a teaching is 
truly effective and its goal is realizable. The procedure is mainly focused on checking a 
person, usually the teacher who lays claim to the accomplishment of the training. It 
guides one to manage successfully the probable partialities in the process of ascertaining 
the efficacy of a doctrine. This gradual procedure of personal verification has three 
stages. The first stage is “preserving the truth” (saccānurakkhanā). At this stage, one may 
assert what one believes to be true on the following five grounds, namely faith or belief 
                                                                                                                                                 
Buddhist means of verification in this light. To simply employ the methodology of philosophy of religion 
to examine religious traditions in non-Western cultures in which distinction between philosophy and 
religion is often lack, is problematic unless the relevant themes and terms are redefined. 
90 This procedure of examination is explained particularly in the Canki sutta (M II 164), and in the other 
discourses such as the Vima◊saka Sutta (M I 317) the CËlahattipadopma Sutta (M I 176), the Brahmāyu 
Sutta (M II 133) with miner variations depending on their contexts. 
91 Asanga Tilakaratne, “Saddhā: A Prerequisite of Religious Action” in Recent Researches in Buddhist 
Studies, (ed.) Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti et al., (Hong Kong: Chi Ying Foundation, 1997) p.602. PED 
glosses the term as “search, examination”. The verb, samannesati is explained as “ to seek, to look for, to 
examine”. p. 683  
92 Sa◊ (wholly)+ anu (gradual) + esanā (search). The Sanskrit equivalent of the term “samanveßaˆå” also 
renders the same meaning. The verb “samanviß” renders; “to search through, to seek about everywhere” 






(saddhā), inclination (ruci), traditional authorization (anussava), reflection on the logical 
format (ākāraparivitakka) and personal preference to certain views (di††hi-nijjhāna-
kanti). It seems that these grounds are preliminary conditions for a person to approach a 
teacher and to take up a training. Initially, one would be interested in and would approach 
a teacher or a training due to one of the above reasons. For example, Asanga Tilakaratne 
convincingly shows how saddhā serves as an indispensable prerequisite for the initiation 
of any action, particularly a committed practice.93 It seems that besides saddhā, the other 
four conditions also play a similar role in one’s approach to a teacher and initiation of a 
serious practice or training. However, interestingly, Buddhist guidelines in this discourse 
caution that one should not come to a definite conclusion about a teacher or training 
based on the above grounds. Those grounds only represent common aspects of the human 
mind and do not have any direct bearing on the truth or efficacy of a teacher or training. 
As we have discussed in the first chapter, these grounds may have either of the two 
consequences, namely being either true or false. For example, regarding saddhā (in this 
case faith or belief) it is said: “even though something may be thoroughly believed in, it 
may be empty, void or false. On the other hand, something not thoroughly believed in, 
may be a fact, true and not otherwise”. Therefore it is further advised in this discourse 
that a person who preserves the truth may well state that “This is my belief” or “This is 
the way I believe”. He can provisionally accept a doctrine as true but should not come to 
a conclusion, basing himself solely on saddhā or any other of the four grounds, that this 
alone is true, all else is false. This is the stage of ‘preserving the truth’ in the procedure of 
personal verification.  
                                                 








“Awakening to the truth” (saccānubodha) is the second stage, and it begins with a 
thorough inquiry into the character of the teacher under whom one is going to learn and 
to be trained.  This inquiry intends to see whether or not the behaviour of the teacher 
already exemplifies what the prospective follower aims to achieve.  In this case, the 
Buddhist learning and training aim at a radical self-transformation which results in the 
elimination of greed, hatred and delusion. So the prospective learner is advised to inquire 
into the character of the teacher to see whether or not his behaviour betrays 
characteristics of greed, hatred and delusion. 
 
It should be noted here that this pattern of the teacher and the student, who then in 
turn becomes a teacher, as Rom Harré remarked94, is a common feature found in Indian 
thought. An understanding of cultural embeddedness of the teacher-student relationship is 
essential to grasp the meaning of verification within the Buddhist context. As David 
Fontana points out in the Buddhist context, the teacher is a teacher not by virtue of what 
he knows but by virtue of what he is.95 
 
The process of inquiry into the character of a teacher is given in detail in this 
manner. A prospective follower “goes to him [the teacher] and carries out an 
investigation on him with regards to the three kinds of states of mind: the states based on 
greed, the states based on hate, and the states based on delusion: ‘Are there in this 
                                                 
94  Rom Harré, One Thousand Years of Philosophy, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p.32                       
95 David Fontana further remarks that the emphasis of the early Buddhism as a training system is not on 
furthering the development of it a discipline per se but on furthering the student’s own development. See 







[teacher] any states based on greed [and hatred and delusion] such that with his mind 
obsessed by those states while not knowing he might say, “I know” or while not seeing 
he might say, “I see”, or he might urge others to act in a way that would lead to harm and 
suffering for a long time?”96. This inquiry focuses on the teacher’s bodily behaviour and 
verbal behaviour in order to check whether those behaviours are affected by the 
abovementioned motivations: greed, hatred and delusion (TathārËpo kho pana  
imassāyasmato kāyasamācāro tathārËpo vacisamācāro yathā ta◊ aluddhassa).   
 
The same process of inquiry is described in a more elaborate manner in the 
V¥ma◊saka Sutta. In this case the teacher who is subjected to inquiry is the Buddha 
himself. The sutta proposes that a rigorous scrutiny should be carried out by making 
observations on the bodily and verbal behaviour of the Buddha (in general cases, that of a 
teacher) by means of visual and auditory observations (dv¥su dhammesu Tathāgato 
samannesitabbo, cakkhusotaviññeyyesu dhammesu). The prospective follower finds out 
that the bodily and verbal behaviour of the teacher (in this case, of the Buddha) 
observable by others by visual and auditory means is entirely free of greed, hatred and 
delusion, that is, his behaviour is neither impure nor of a mixed nature as in the case of 
unenlightened beings. Then he should further carry on his inquiry more rigorously in 
order to determine whether such behaviour is merely a transient state of the teacher or 
whether it has come to stay as a permanent behaviour pattern. This sutta further advises 
one to be sure that the teacher is flawless in conduct, not by reputation nor by 
appearances but by an actual inner transformation of the personality.  
                                                 







This procedure of inquiry recommends the prospective follower to have a critical 
approach. Regarding this method of inquiry P.D.Premasiri remarks,   
 
…the Buddha is introducing here a method of acquiring knowledge of the mental 
condition of another by a continuous process of observation and empirical testing. 
The person, who does the observation, need not himself be or become enlightened 
in order to apprehend the fact that the person on whom he is carrying out the 
observations and tests is enlightened. It is one thing to say that the experience of 
liberation and the bliss and happiness of it can be experienced only by one who is 
enlightened and another thing to say that any observant and perceptive person can 
apply in order to find out whether another person is enlighted, liberated and 
happy.97 
 
In this saccānubodha stage the follower as an inquirer subsequently encounters 
the following process as it appears in the discourses.  
 
After examining the teacher and beholding that he is purified of states of 
confusion then he reposes his faith ―or confidence― (saddhā) in him; with faith 
born he draws close; drawing close he sits down near by; sitting down near by he 
lends ear; lending ear he listens the dhamma; having listened the dhamma he 
remembers; he tests the meaning of the things he remembers; while testing the 
                                                 
97  P.D. Premasiri “The Vimansaka Sutta and Contemporary Philosophy of Religion” in Sri Lanka Journal 






meaning of the things are approved of; if there is approval of things aspiration is 
born; with aspiration born he makes effort; having made an effort he weighs it up; 
having weighed it up he strives; being self-resolute he realizes with his person the 
highest truth itself; and penetrating it by means of intuitive wisdom, he sees. It is 
to this extent…that there is an awakening to truth. 98 
 
One can see two occurrences of saddhā in this process up to this point. The first 
one is in the saccānurakkhanā (preserving truth) stage as one of five grounds based on 
which a person would initially make an assertion. Secondly, the saddhā occurs in the 
saccānubodha stage (awakening to the truth) as a consequent event. It should be noted 
here that two instances of saddhā stand for two different mental states. The first 
occurrence of saddhā refers to a mere believing mentality, which serves a person initially 
to make an assertion. Saddhā referred to in the second stage is a result of careful 
examination. It is a form of resultant conviction after a rigorous scrutiny, and therefore, it 
has to be different from the saddhā in the first stage. It is a rational faith (as referred to by 
Jayatilleke), or in other words, a justified belief 99(as referred to by Tilakaratne) through 
examination. It is this form of saddhā that the follower is encouraged to develop. This is 
the ideal form of saddhā upheld in early Buddhism.  
 
             It is at this point that one can see Hoffman’s mistake in generalizing saddhā in 
early Buddhism. Hoffman’s argument against Jayatilleke highlights the affective element 
                                                 
98 M II 174. As translated by Asanga Tillekeratne, op.cit., p.601 
99 Tilakaratne differentiates the philosopher’s popular use of the term, “justified true belief” from his own 
use of the term, “justified belief”. The term in this context is strictly psychological and in this sense, belief, 






in saddhā and claims that saddhā in many cases is prior to understanding the doctrine. He 
further says that faith in the Buddha is the cause of the faith in the Dhamma (statements 
of the Buddha) and faith is not always ‘subsequent to checking’. As such saddhā, 
according to Hoffman, cannot be a rational faith and cannot be counted as a crucial stage 
of personal verification as Jayatilleke maintains. The above discussion reveals two 
possible occurrences of saddhā and clearly shows that resultant faith of a rigorous 
scrutiny or “rational faith”, found in the second stage, is taken as the ideal form in early 
Buddhism. Moreover it is usually focused on the Buddha. These findings directly 
contradict Hoffman’s view on saddhā. This faith is clearly “subsequent to checking” and 
it is a result of one’s intelligent appraisal and deep investigation into the behaviour and 
character of the Buddha (or the teacher).  
 
             Hoffman refers to a passage in the Majjhima-nikāya, which reads, “If saddhā is 
born, then he approaches” and comments that this saddhå is prior to investigation. He 
takes this passage in isolation without referring to its context. The discourse where this 
passage is found clearly describes how this saddhā is born.  It is born as a result of a 
thorough inquiry.100 His examples do not point out any instance where saddhā precedes 
one’s checking although the early Buddhist discourses refer to the instances of that kind 
of saddhā.  The instances of saddhā where it may precede one’s checking and 
understanding is the believing mentality that is found in the first occurrence. What is 
valued in early Buddhism is the type of saddhā found in the second occurrence. A 
prospective follower is encouraged to initiate his learning and training based on the 
                                                 
100  See M II 168-174, and The Middle Length Saying, I.B.Horner (Tr) (London: Pali Text Society, 1967) 






resultant saddhā of deep scrutiny.101 Therefore Hoffman’s conclusion that saddhā as a 
priori, which justifies the beliefs of early Buddhism, is an overgeneralization. Hoffman’s 
view is largely a result of his failure to see the difference between the two occurrences of 
saddhā. His view mixes up of two kinds of saddhā that appear in two different stages of 
one’s endeavour. The first one is ‘believing mentality’ that is, common to human actions, 
and the second one is ‘justified belief’ which is advocated in Buddhist practice.102   
 
However, even at this second stage of the awakening to truth, the Buddha says 
that one is not in a position to assert that this (his understanding) alone is true and all else 
is empty. The final stage is the ‘attainment of truth’ (saccānuppatti), which is the 
conclusion of the practice of the doctrine started at the second stage.  
 
“The final arrival at the truth, Bhāradvāja, lies in the repetition, development, 
and cultivation of those same things [i.e. the procedure described in the above 
                                                 
101 Piya Tan glosses the two kinds of faith referred to in early Buddhist discourses. The first kind is 
“rootless faith” (amulaka,saddhā), baseless, irrational or a priori (before the fact) faith, blind faith. (M II 
170) and the other kind is “faith with a good cause” (Ākāravati,saddhā), a posteriori (after the fact) faith, 
faith founded on seeing (M I 320) and is also called avecca-p,pasāda (S II 69). See Piya Tan, Sutta 
Discovery Vol.9 (The Maha Parinibbāna Sutta, Introduction), 2004. 
102 Rupert Gethin also recognizes two aspects of saddhā: the cognitive and the affective: “Faith in its 
cognitive dimension is seen as concerning belief in propositions or statements of which one does not—or 
perhaps cannot—have knowledge proper (however that should be defined); cognitive faith is a mode of 
knowing in a different category from that knowledge. Faith is its affective dimension is a more 
straightforward positive response to trust or confidence towards something or somebody…the conception 
of saddhā in Buddhist writings appears almost, if not entirely affective, the cognitive element is completely 
secondary” (Gethin, Path to Awakening, Oxford, 2001 p.207ff). It is true that saddhā is predominantly 
affective in nature: as a confidence initially and as a conviction in developed levels. The point I make here 
is that the ideal form of saddhā in early Buddhism, though it is affective, is to be established after a 







quotation]” (Tesa◊ye, bhāradvāja, dhammāna◊ āsevanā bhāvanā 
bahulīkamma◊ saccānupatti hoti).103  
 
The above process of “testing the meaning”, “weighing up”, “striving” and so on, 
clearly lays down a process of “personal verification”. It is with the continuous and 
repeated engagement in this process that one can come to conclusive knowledge. At this 
point saddhā, which initially served as a justified guide in personal verification is 
completely replaced by paññå or intuitive wisdom.  Only at this point he is able to claim 
that he has arrived at the truth.  
 
This process of verification is explained with an interesting analogy in another 
early Buddhist discourse.104 This act of verification is compared to the procedure 
followed by a clever elephant tracker in tracking a bull elephant.   
 
An elephant tracker might enter an elephant forest and might see a large footprint, 
long and broad. But a skilled elephant tracker does not come to the conclusion 
immediately: “indeed it is a great bull elephant.” What is the reason for this?  
There are, Brahman, in the forest stunted she- elephants who have large footprints 
and he thinks that this might be a footprint of theirs (or resulted by other natural 
causes). In this manner, the elephant tracker observes many clues without coming 
to a conclusion till he actually sees that bull elephant itself at the root of a tree or 
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in the open air. Then only does he come to conclusion that this is that bull-
elephant.  
 
In this same manner a prospective follower is advised to investigate, guided by 
justified trust or belief, without reaching an absolute conclusion until he fully realizes the 
truth of the doctrine. This principle of verification underlines the early Buddhist practice 
at large.  
 
Such a process of verification is termed sacchikaroti in early Buddhist discourses. 
As given in the discourses, the tenets in early Buddhism are to be “personally verified” 
by the learner or trainee (sacchikaraˆ¥yo, sacchikātabba◊). 105  Etymological 
understanding of the term would be helpful to grasp the full significance of this process. 
Sa (one’s own) + acchi (eye)  + karoti (makes) etymologically means, “see with one’s 
own eyes”.106  
 
Unfortunately Hoffman gives a wrong etymology to this term and overlooks the 
attached significance. He wrongly breaks up the term, sacchikatvā (absolutive form of 
sacchikaroti) as sacca + katvā changing the word “sacchi” to “sacca” and wrongly 
explains the term, “Sacca means ‘true’ or ‘correct’, and katvā, ‘made’ or 
‘established’”107.  He further comments: “ ‘True’ is here not used as a property of a 
proposition, but as a property of utterance… Eo ipso, sacchikatva cannot refer to 
                                                 
105 A II. 183 (sacchikaraˆ¥yo), D III. 292 (sacchikåtabba), D III 55 (sacchikatvå), M III 289 (sacchikaroti).  
The term, paccatta◊ veditabbo viññuhi, which generally means, “to be known personally by the wise” (M I 
38, D III 6) is also referred to the same meaning.  
106 PED also gives the meanings: “to see with ones eye, to realize, to experience for oneself”.  p. 668 






verification in this sort of the positivist’s sense”.108 By altering the word, “sacchi” which 
means “one’s own eye (or senses)” to “sacca” which means “true” he misreads the term 
sacchikatvā  and completely fails to see the unique sense of the term. The term does not 
refer to any notion of truth. It does not mean to ascribe truth-value to a proposition or to 
an utterance. It simply means “experiencing for oneself” as clearly shown above. 
Hoffman is correct to say that the term does not stand for verification in the strict 
positivist sense but he does not draw out the correct meaning of the term. Hoffman’s 
treatment of the term distorts the authentic sense of the term, that is, experiencing for 
oneself (through one’s own senses), and overlooks its significance in identifying the 
experiential aspect of the notion of verification in early Buddhism. 
 
The above discussion illustrates that early Buddhism maintains a critical and 
investigative approach throughout its training. This gives an experiential outlook to early 
Buddhism. This experiential outlook, however, is not analogous to that of Western 
empirical sciences but it has a unique sense within its context. Any non-cognitivist 
interpretation of early Buddhism is not possible without distorting this fundamental 
feature. However Hoffman in his attempt to reject “the Buddhist empiricism thesis” 
seems to have overlooked this dominant experiential outlook of early Buddhism.    
 
Hoffman attempts to identify some features of religious belief (in the popular 
Western sense of the term) in early Buddhism. If one were to emphasize religious nature 
of early Buddhism, it is important to take into account two considerations. Firstly, the 
nature of philosophical thoughts and traditions in the early Indian context should be taken 







into account. Earlier, we discussed that in the early Indian context, there was no clear-cut 
distinction between philosophy and religion.  The roles of these two distinctive realms as 
understood in the West were complementary in the early Indian context, rather than 
contradictory. Secondly, one should not ignore that early Buddhism in particular differs 
characteristically from the religious systems, which demand unconditional faith on the 
part of the believers. As it was shown in the above discussion, the religious commitment 
of the disciples in early Buddhist context is not the surrendering of one’s independent 
powers of understanding to a superhuman source but a rational commitment based on a 
certain degree of initial confidence gained by a careful examination. The disciple is 
required to duplicate the attainment or enlightenment of the teacher and he is not graced 
by any supernatural power.  
 
2.2.2 Religious Experience 
 
              In Hoffman’s view, experiences of abhiññā are meaningful only in the context 
of doctrinal assumptions. Those experiences are part of the ‘background’ against which 
other beliefs in early Buddhism are seen as true by believers. Thus these types of 
experiences are analogous to “religious experiences”. Hoffman examines only the 
particular sense-abilities called abhiññā, disregarding the other types of experiences on 
which early Buddhist verification is based, and generalizes early Buddhist verification as 







             Hoffman’s view on “religious experience” is restricted to those of Western 
theistic religions. It is arguable whether we can use the definitions of “religious 
experience” in the context of Western theistic religions to cover unusual or mystical 
experiences in non-western cultures, particularly the types of experiences recognized in 
early Buddhism as the means of verification.  
 
It was Rudolf Otto who delineated the idea of “religious experience” within the 
context of Western theistic religions. Rudolf Otto (following Schleiermacher) in his The 
Idea of the Holy defined “religious experience” with the term that he coined “numinous”, 
which he derived from the Latin word numen (a spirit).109 Ninian Smart comments on 
Otto,  
 
For Otto the numinous experience is at the heart of religion. He defined it as 
the experience of something that is a mysterium tremendum et fascinans―a 
mystery that is fearful, awe-inspiring, and fascinating, and that, for all its 
fearfulness, draws you towards it. You get something of this feeling looking 
over a cliff. Doesn’t the great drop inspire fear, and yet aren’t you also drawn 
towards it, so much so that sometimes you have to make a conscious effort to 
draw back? But above all, the sense of presence that confronts a person in the 
numinous experience is majestic: marvelous in power and glory. In their 
                                                 
109 Ninian Smart explains that this term, numen stands for the sort of spirit that in Roman religion haunted 
the rivers and the copses and strange places and the threshold and the hearth which works as unseen forces 
sending a thrill of fear and power down one’s back. See “The Experiential Dimension” in Philosophy of 
Religion: Towards A Global Perspective, (ed.) Gary E.Kessler (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999) 






rather different ways the experiences of Arjuna, Isaiah, Job, Paul and 
Muhammad are all numinous in character.110 
 
It is interesting to note that unusual or mystical experiences (that cannot be 
explained in terms of reason alone) found in other (non-Western) cultures, when we 
examine closely, do not seem to fall within the above definition. In the context of 
mystical experiences of other cultures the above definition is not satisfactory. Ninian 
Smart correctly observes that mystical experiences in the Indian context do not seem to 
have the qualities Otto ascribed to the numinous. He finds that the practice of yogic 
meditation aims at purifying the consciousness of the individual.  
 
It is as if the meditator is ascending a kind of inner ladder where at the 
highest rungs he or she gains a kind of pure bliss and insight, free from the 
distractions of ordinary experience. Very often this highest state is spoken of 
as being “non-dual”…[It] is usually said to involve the stilling of all feelings 
and the attainment of a perfect quietness. This is very different from the 
dynamic and shattering experience of the numinous.111 
 
In examining non-Western religions the current studies in philosophy of religion 
have recognized the need of redefining relevant terms and of introducing the new terms. 
However Hoffman refers to definitions of religious experience given based on Western 
theistic religions and interprets the types of verifying experiences recognized in early 
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Beliefs 2nd ed., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1995, p. 58-73) 






Buddhism as analogous to “religious experience” in Western theistic religions. He seems 
to rely heavily on Stewart R. Sutherland’s definition of “religious experience”.112     
 
He equates the enlightenment of the Buddha with St. Paul’s experience on the 
road to Damascus. He claims: 
 
Two points of agreement between the Damascus road and Nerañjarā river 
experiences emerge: first, the experiences are not just titillations of individual 
awareness in a dramatic way, but involve a change in beliefs. Secondly, this 
change in beliefs is marked by actions which show conviction that the path is 
right.113   
 
Then he cites Sutherland on the Damascus road experience to show the similarities of 
both types of experiences.  
 
To understand the significance of that experiencewhat makes it 
religiousis to grasp the role, which it plays in the life of the believer. The 
experience modifies how he sees his life, how he behaves, and so on, and in 
parallel fashion the way in which he sees the experience in question may 
alter in the light of his developing biography. The attempt to understand a 
                                                 
112 Steward R. Sutherland, “St. Paul’s Damascus Experience” in Sophia Vol. 14, 1975, p. 15 






particular experience in the absence of at least some access to the 
subsequent biography is doomed to produce a distorted picture.114  
 
Besides identifying two superficial similarities Hoffman seems to fail to identify 
significant differences between them.  Based on the above description a few 
characteristics of the Damascus road experience emerge. Firstly, it seems that the 
experience in question is a momentary one that appears in a flash. Secondly, that 
experience is caused by some external supernatural power. Thirdly, that experience is not 
available for the person in question in his subsequent life unless as a memory. Since the 
experience in question appears only once but leaves a great impact on the life of the 
believer, the way one sees that experience in question may alter in the light of his 
developing biography.  
 
In the context of early Buddhism there is a variety of extraordinary experiences 
that one (mistakenly) could categorize as “religious experiences”.  Basically these 
extraordinary experiences are of two types. They are Jhānic (meditative) experiences and 
Nibbānic (Skt. Nirvānic) experience (the experience of enlightenment). When we 
consider the Jhānic or meditative experiences, they seem to lack all the above 
characteristics. Firstly, the Jhānic experiences are not momentary. They are not the kind 
of experiences that unusually appears once in the life of a practitioner. In other words, 
they are not temporary encounters such as unusual miraculous events or ‘celestial 
fireworks’, to use Sutherland’s term. When a practitioner attains the meditative states, he 
                                                 







is able to maintain those experiences within him as long as he wishes. Secondly, these 
experiences are to be achieved by a systematic gradual training. They are willfully 
produced by the practitioner as a result of his effortful training and practice. As such the 
meditative experiences are not considered in early Buddhism as experiences that are 
caused in the practitioner’s mind by some external supernatural power. These spheres of 
knowledge are to be developed and to be experienced. Thirdly once a practitioner 
achieved the meditative skills he can reproduce meditative experiences whenever he 
wants. Therefore meditative experiences are available for a practitioner in his subsequent 
stages of life. In that case there is no possibility of altering the way that one sees 
experiences in question in the person’s subsequent biography. These dissimilarities show 
that it is problematic to reckon the Jhānic (meditative) experiences in early Buddhism as 
simply identical to religious experiences in the sense of Western theistic religions.  
 
Then the Nirvānic experience or Buddhist enlightenment does not refer to a 
mental state that a practitioner, from time to time, attains and maintains for a period of 
time as in the case of Jhānic experiences. It refers to a complete transformation of human 
personality. Enlightenment is defined as complete eradication of unwholesome 
psychological roots of human personality. As such it is characterized in early Buddhism 
as a “living experience”. (This aspect will be discussed later in detail). If we take 
“religious experience” to mean a momentary encounter with an unusual sight, sound or 
other sensory feeling, then it also seems problematic to identify the enlightenment which 







A religious experience in general is said to have the characteristic of irrefutability. 
A religious experience is irrefutable for the individual who had it. William James in 
discussing mysticism points out this feature of religious or mystical experiences. He 
observes, “Mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and have the right to be, 
absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come.”115 As such religious 
experiences are accepted unquestionably in an authoritative sense. Hoffman seems to 
have this idea in his mind when he interprets abhiññā.  Following Jayatilleke Hoffman 
takes abhiññā only to mean the particular extrasensory abilities and deems that 
experiences of abhiññā are personal experiences, which are irrefutable in principle. 
Hoffman takes the experiences of abhiññā, just as in the case of religious experience in 
general, to be taken for granted in early Buddhism. Nevertheless I argue that experiences 
of particular extrasensory abilities called abhiññā and other meditative experiences are 
not accepted uncritically in early Buddhism. These experiences are not treated as 
authoritative.  Early Buddhism is of the view that these experiences are still vulnerable to 
conceptualization and misinterpretation. In other words, experiences of abhiññā and 
meditative experiences also undergo the constructive activities of the mind. What is 
central to the early Buddhist notion of verification is not particular extrasensory abilities, 
abhiññā but the penetrative cognitive skill that deconstructs the embedded layers of 
experience, ordinary or meditative.  
 
                                                 






Hoffman by taking abhiññā only to mean the particular extrasensory abilities and 
by generalizing these experiences as analogous to “religious experiences” in the popular 
sense overlooks the deconstructive nature of the early Buddhist verification.    
 
2.3 Evaluation  
 
Both Jayatilleke’s interpretation and Hoffman’s critique fail to recognize the 
deconstructive nature of the early Buddhist notion of verification. Jayatilleke’s 
interpretation, unless redefined, risks oversimplification and Hoffman’s critique leads to 
trivialization. The case should be made here to identify the deconstructive nature of the 
early Buddhist notion of verification, which is ignored in the above two treatments of the 
notion due to their over dependence on empiricism of Western philosophy (by 
Jayatilleke) and on the Western concept of religion (by Hoffman). The attempt should be 
made to closely examine the textual treatment of the notion and to understand it in its 








Embeddedness of Conceptual Knowledge 
 
The early Buddhist analysis of knowledge offers a deep insight into the genesis of 
conceptual knowledge. It recognizes the proliferating tendency of the mind, which leads 
the perceiver to conceptualize and to manifest the initial sensory experience in various 
ways. Inner proclivities and inclinations and psychological urges of the individual largely 
condition his conceptualization. Conceptualization is, of course, largely a subjectively 
driven process. Initial sensory experience soon converts into conceptual knowledge with 
the influence of both cognitive and non-cognitive factors of human personality. Thus the 
early Buddhist analysis offers an interesting critique of conceptual knowledge. This 
critique is greatly helpful in identifying the full significance of the notion of verification 
in early Buddhism.116 
 
In this chapter I will present the early Buddhist evaluation of the embeddedness of 
conceptual knowledge. I will show that, according to early Buddhism, the construction of 
conceptual knowledge is largely underlined by the proliferating tendency of the mind 
                                                 
116 The early Buddhist discourse namely the Brahmajāla Sutta (D. I.1) (The discourse on the All 
Embracing Net of Views), which presents a comprehensive critique of philosophical views elaborates 62 
possible views on the nature of self and the world. This discourse is said to contain all possible 
philosophical theories or views on the above two metaphysical issues that human cognition can produce 
at any time and any where. So it is said to cover the whole range of humanity’s speculative belief systems 
and is named as ‘the Net of Views that cast upon the pool of human thought’. It deserves a deep 








which leads one to conceptualize and to manifest the initial sensory experience in various 
ways. The discussion will reveal the inner urges of human personality which serve as the 
basis for the manifestation of conceptual knowledge. Further I will show the relative 
value given to conceptual knowledge in early Buddhism. 
 
3.1 Proliferating Tendency of the Mind 
 
Early Buddhism while highlighting the constructive role of the mind in the 
organization of sensory experience recognizes the proliferating tendency of the mind. As 
we saw in the previous chapter the early Buddhist analysis of sensory process shows how 
the raw sensory data go through various discernments, categorizations and 
manifestations. In the early Buddhist analysis of sensory process the cognitive events, 
vitakka and papañca, signify complex prolific activities of the mind. While Vitakka refers 
to the initial application of reasoning about the conception of the sense-object the 
subsequent cognitive event, papañca refers to the mental proliferation of the conceived 
sensory object. These cognitive events reflect the proliferating tendency of the mind. 
With the influence of this tendency the sensory process actively flows through various 
channels of mental manifestation. The proliferating tendency of the mind keeps forming 
“concepts” (saññā) within human personality. As these “concepts” are formed as 
products of prolific sensory process they are also termed ‘ papañca saññā sankhā’ 







Our knowledge is largely conditioned by these concepts formed by the 
proliferating tendency of the mind. We organize our understanding with the help of these 
concepts. Early Buddhism shows that our knowledge is embedded in concepts. It is with 
these concepts that we grasp the flow of experience. In our understanding we impose 
concepts on the flow of experience. At the end the flow of experience is arrested and split 
by concepts.  
 
Early Buddhism admits that concepts are useful in one’s understanding as devices 
to grasp the flow of experience yet it shows that in an ordinary process of understanding 
concepts are not employed as mere devices. Concepts are generally taken as rigid 
identities. Thus concepts are invested with the problem of identity and difference. It is 
with the help of constructed concepts that identities and differentiations of one another 
are established. In an ordinary understanding this insubstantial construction of concepts is 
easily forgotten and ultimate validity is given to identities and differences, which are 
drawn initially from constructed concepts. Though concepts are legitimate to use as 
devices of understanding, concepts are generally taken as ultimate categories. Concepts 
are frozen into rigidities. Thus in the early Buddhist point of view, our conceptual 
knowledge is embedded with this undue value given to concepts.  
 
Early Buddhism further shows that the strict sense of identification and 
differentiation and undue rigid value given to concepts tend to resolve themselves into 
various views and theories to which undue absolute value are ascribed.   Early Buddhism 






subjective experience. Within a fragment of experience one selects some pattern and 
constructs a concept. By exaggeration of these concepts to all proportion of sense 
experience and universalizing them to infinity one gets views and theories. As a result of 
projecting them to the status of objective reality, each theory or view claims to be a 
complete and only picture of all things.117  Thus our conceptual knowledge is embedded 
with the above flaw, that is, ‘proclaiming a part of the truth to be the whole’. This 
situation is clearly illustrated in the Buddha’s famous parable of the ‘blind men who take 
their own limited experience of an elephant to adequately represent the elephant in its 
fullness.’118 
 
It is this flaw that is implied in the term, ‘adhivuttipada’, which is employed in 
early Buddhist discourses to refer to speculative metaphysical views.  The term literally 
means ‘overstatement’119. The characterizing metaphysical views as ‘overstatements’ 
radically presents early Buddhist attitude on views. It seems that views are taken as 
‘overstatements’ in two senses. One is the sense of an exaggeration of a particular 
fragment of experience to the whole experiential reality and the other is in the sense of an 
extra evaluation of concepts and views as ultimate categories or patterns.    
 
The limitation of conceptual knowledge is clearly presented in the discussion on 
the duality of absolute affirmation and absolute negation. Early Buddhism regards the 
                                                 
117 The Brahmajāla Sutta (D I 22) and the Mahākamma vibhanga Sutta (M III 211) point out that many 
contemporary thinkers have formulated views and theories by projecting their subjective experiences to the 
objective world and by elevating their subjective experiences to the status of objective truth.   
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following two statements as the extremes of ontological claims.120 They are the claim, 
“all exists [in absolute sense]” (sabbam atthi) and the claim, “nothing exists [in absolute 
sense]”(sabbam natthi). The former represents eternalism (sassatavāda) and the latter 
represents annihilationism (ucchedavāda). Surprisingly, the world at large is said to lean 
upon one of these extreme views. Once the Buddha addressing Kaccāyana said “This 
world (the worldlings), Kaccāyana, mostly rests on a duality: upon the notion of 
‘existence’ and the notion of ‘non-existence’.”121 
 
Early Buddhist doctrines seemed to emerge as a critical response to the mutual 
opposition of these two extremes. So it is repeatedly said, ‘not following either of these 
extremes, the Buddha teaches his doctrine by the middle’.122 It is worth noticing here that 
two important terms used in the above statement are abstract nouns, i.e. atthitā  (“is-
ness”), natthitā (“is-less-ness”). What these terms render is the abstract substantialist 
conceptions of existence and non- existence. Regarding this, Bhiikhu Bodhi remarks,  
 
In view of these explanations it would be misleading to translate these two 
terms, atthitā and natthitā, simply as “existence” and “non-existence” and 
then to maintain (as is sometimes done) that the Buddha rejects all ontological 
notions as inherently invalid. The Buddha’s utterance at the Puppha Sutta (S 
III 139), for example, shows that he did not hesitate to make pronouncements 
with a clear ontological import when they were called for. In the present 
passage atthitā and natthitā are abstract nouns formed from the verbs atthi and 
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natthi. It is thus the metaphysical assumptions implicit in such abstractions 
that are at fault, not the ascriptions of existence and non- existence 
themselves.123 
 
Our conceptual knowledge is generally embedded in the notion of absolute 
existence or the notion of non-existence. Early Buddhism does not believe that one is not 
able to accurately grasp the actual flow of reality with these rigid abstract concepts.   
 
Early Buddhism further points to another defect of conceptual knowledge. The 
instances of conceptual knowledge, i.e. concepts, views, and theories, have a tendency to 
produce a habit of intellectualization within the individual’s personality. The habit of 
intellectualization ties the individual to the level of ideation, that is, overly reasoning and 
theorization limited to the intellect may produce complacency within the ideational 
realm, which obstructs one’s practical engagement in the actual states of affair. One may 
find more interesting in reasoning and theorization than in practical engagement in the 
affairs. This position is emphasized in the parable of the man struck with a poisoned 
arrow (the CËlamālunkya Sutta).124 Then conceptual knowledge may represent 
                                                 
123 Bhikku Bodhi, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000) p. 734  
124 The Parable of the man stuck with a poisoned arrow is as follows: 
Suppose, Mālunkyaputta, a man were wounded by an arrow thickly smeared with poison, and his 
friends and companions brought a surgeon to treat him. The man would say: ‘I will not let the 
surgeon pull out the arrow until I know the name and clan of the man who wounded me; until I know 
the height and the skin colour of him and the village or town that he lives in; until I know whether 
the bowstring that wounded me was fiber or reed or sinew or hemp or bark;…whether the bow that 
wounded me was a long bow or a crossbow; whether the arrow that wounded me was hoof-tipped or 
curved or barbed.’  
All this would still not be known to that man and meanwhile he would die. So too, Malunkyaputta, 
if anyone should say: ‘I will not lead the noble life under the Buddha until the Buddha declares to 
me whether the world is eternal or not eternal, finite or infinite; whether the soul is the same as or 
different from the body; whether or not an awakened one continues or ceases to exist after death,’ 






intellectual fabrications and mere speculations rather than the genuine grasp of actual 
states of affairs.  
 
Thus conceptual knowledge is largely conditioned by the proliferating tendency 
of the mind. Saññā or concepts are formed in the mind of the perceiver as a result of 
continuous proliferating reactions to initial sensory data. These saññā or concepts, in 
turn, influence the subsequent sensory experiences. These saññā and their continuous 
applications generally form a “habitual conceptual framework” within the perceiver, 
which determines his construction of sensory experience. Our knowledge by and large is 
embedded in this habitual conceptual framework.    
  
3.2 Inner Urges  
 
Early Buddhism also addresses the deeper level of the human mind, which 
governs the construction of conceptual knowledge, particularly speculative views. Early 
Buddhist findings penetrate into psychological motives and mental dispositions, which 
serve as the basis for views. One formulates views largely in response to certain internal 
urges of human personality. Deep-rooted emotional tendencies manifest as compulsive 
urges of human personality. In most occasions, theories and views are formulated to 
satisfy these compulsive urges. Attempts to comprehend the nature of experiential reality 
can easily be directed or rather misguided by one’s inner urges. Particularly, in this case 
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early Buddhism recognizes an underlying tendency by human beings to establish and to 
maintain a basis of permanence within the experiential reality (which is inherently a 
constant process). This is the tendency repeatedly addressed in early Buddhist discussions 
of views and speculations. It seems that this particular tendency of human mind has, 
though recently, received the attention of the Western scholarship. For example, Stebbing 
claims; 
 
There seems to be a deep rooted tendency in the human mind to seek what is 
identical, in the sense of something that persists through change…Hence the 
search for an underlying entity, a persistent stuff, a substance…Hence the 
popularity of substance theories in science.125 
 
If this is the case, the views and theories are in a bid to establish a base of 
permanence upon experiential reality. Although these theories and views largely reflect 
the inner urges of the individual they are generally presented as objectively valid.  
  
One way of trying to achieve this base of permanence is to seek for ‘uniformities’ 
within experiential reality. Imagination and conceptualization function together to 
formulate uniformities partly motivated by the above mentioned inner tendency. The 
whole process functions as a response to the inner need of seeing the whole experiential 
reality in a single unifying way. Ultimately this is a need and construction on our part. It 
                                                 







is then more probable that a theory or a view represents internal need of the individual, 
not necessarily the patterns of the experiential reality itself.  
 
This inner need exemplifies the dislike for proliferation of instances of 
experience. It is fueled again by a strong desire for predictability by the human mind. 
Theories and views are means by which human beings have often tried to guarantee 
predictability against proliferation of proceedings. Ironically, speculative views are 
considered in early Buddhism as results of proliferation in the ideational realm. Views 
are seen as the most typical instances of ‘papañca’ on the sense of prolific 
conceptualization. Here it appears to be an ironic situation. In the first place, the 
formulation of a view or a theory was done to unify the instances of experience over 
time as a response to internal dislike of the proliferation of experiences. But in this 
unifying formulation what actually happens is the internal proliferation in the 
conceptual level. One engages in internal proliferation by unifying external events of 
experience. The more one internally proliferates, the further he goes away from the 
actual situation as illustrated in the following passage. 
 
The more one conceptualizes the sense object the more it becomes otherwise. 
(The thinker sets himself far from the actual picture). And herein lies its falseness, 
the immature deceptive phenomenon that it is.126 
 
                                                 







In the early Buddhist perspective, whenever one conceptualizes or theorizes, he 
does it in terms of inner urges. So the conceptual proliferation is governed by these 
urges. They are generally quite opposite to the way things flow.  Then, most probably, 
views do not represent the nature of the way things are.  
 
With the insight that our inner urges (which include desires and expectations) 
have an impact on our beliefs and views, no view or theory can be regarded as an 
objective description of things. Rather, they seem to appear, in this light, as 
prescriptions to view or understand the nature of reality in a certain way.  Murti, in his 
interpretation of Mādyamika system, takes up this theme and comments;     
 
Philosophy selects a particular pattern from among several exemplified in 
things, exaggerates it out of all proportion and universalizes it to infinity. 
The pattern or concept so selected and universalized becomes an Idea of 
Reason, as Kant calls it…But having chosen one, consciously or rather 
unconsciously, we universalize it and take it as the norm of evaluation. 
Though innocently stated as a description of facts, every philosophical 
system is an evaluation of things or a prescription to view them in a 
particular way.127  
 
A question to be raised here is what impels us to select one particular pattern or 
point of view. What determines what to be selected? Early Buddhism has a clear answer 
                                                 








for this: the selection comes about from one’s internal urges.  We select ‘a pattern 
among several exemplified in things’, which is most fitting to the patterns of our inner 
urges.   
 
What is pronounced here is that views are fabricated and proclaimed in a way that 
they are able to satisfy certain inner urges. Early Buddhism displays a considerable 
concern for these inner urges, which are exemplified as existential needs and it 
evaluates the role of these inner urges in giving rise to various views. It is revealed that 
views particularly regarding metaphysical entities are largely emerged in response to 
these inner existential urges.  
 
The prominent existential urge recognized in early Buddhism is ‘craving’ (Tanhā, 
literary means ‘thirst’). Craving is identified three fold, namely, for sensual pleasure, for 
existence, and for non- existence. In discussing the connection between these existential 
urges and metaphysical views, Bhiikhu Bodhi aptly states,  
 
If we explore precisely how craving functions as a condition in relation to 
views, we can see the different types of craving will be instrumental in the 
formulation of different philosophical views. The most powerful craving in 
man is the craving for existence… to satisfy our yearning for continued 
existence we fabricate views proclaiming the immortality of the imagined 
core of our being.128 
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This means that we believe in a certain metaphysical core of our being not just 
because the experiential evidences inform us, but rather because we are impelled by our 
desire to believe in such a thing. Craving for existence is at the very bottom of the 
views, which affirm eternal existence of the self in a future life. Jayatilleke, in this 
regard, says, “The belief in soul and substance thus not only have their origin in our 
linguistic habits but are also rooted in a craving in us to believe in them”129 
 
Even the opposite view, which rejects any metaphysical substance and eternalism, 
is also impelled by a different kind of desires. Two other aspects of craving shown 
above give rise to this view. As Bhikkhu Bodhi puts it, 
 
 When craving for sense pleasure is most prominent, it may lead to the 
annihilationist position asserting the extinction of self upon the break-up of 
the body at death; for this position gives license to untrammeled indulgence in 
sense pleasures…..The craving for non-existence endangers views proclaimed 
the reality of the annihilation that is yearned for. In its simplest form, this 
craving, the result perhaps of personal frustration and deprivation, issues in 
the wish for annihilation immediately after death.130 
 
The view of eternalism and the view of annihilationism emerge fueled by these 
existential urges. The mutual opposition between these two views is often referred in 
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early Buddhist discourses and is deemed that all views and theories generally lean upon 
one of these two ‘umbrella views’. With the given reason above, the conflict of these two 
opposing views could represent the vacillation of human mind. Y. Karunadasa explicitly 
puts,  
 
The mutual conflict between sassatavada (eternalism) and ucchedavada 
(annihilationism) represents not only the perennial conflict between the 
spiritual and the materialist theories of existence but also the human mind’s 
oscillation between two deep-seated desires.131     
 
Then it is clear that non-cognitive factors of human personality such as desires 
largely govern one’s forming of concepts, views, and theories. As such conceptual 
knowledge is embedded in non-cognitive factors of human personality.   
 
3.3 The Core of Views 
 
The Buddhist analysis finally touches the very core of the genesis of conceptual 
knowledge, particularly views. Interestingly, the presence of a vast tangle of views is 
purely ascribed to one particular view. That is, the personality view: the view of an 
abiding permanent self within individuality. It recognizes ‘the egocentric perspective’ as 
the core which gives rise to variety of views.  
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At the level of ordinary sensory experience, the individual accepts the notion of 
selfhood uncritically. Initially, as a convenient device when sensory experiences occur, 
a fictitious ‘experiencer’ is assumed. This imposed notion becomes strong in the 
subsequent conceptual proliferation of the sensory process fuelled by inner desires. It is 
then fully crystallized and justified at the conceptual level. Thus, the notion of ‘I’ both 
comprehends and underlies the sensory process. Indicating the deep rooted latent 
tendency towards this ‘identification’, Ñāˆananda comments, 
 
From the standpoint of the average worldling, there is an ego as the agent or 
mentor behind the sum total of sensory experience…its reality as an 
incontrovertible self evident fact of experience, is readily granted. Even at 
the end of a thorough introspection, he is often tempted to agree with 
Descartes in concluding ‘Cogito, ergo sum’ (“I think, therefore, I am”).132      
 
Karunadasa explicitly shows that this ‘self- identification’ is given in early 
Buddhism as the core of the origin of views.133 It is through ‘self-identification’ either 
with material body, sensory experience or metaphysical notion that one is driven to 
fabricate various views regarding the nature of self and its relationship to the world. The 
process of identification can be manifested in three ways as shown in the following 
passage of the early Buddhist discourses. 
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“When uninstructed individual is impressed by a sensation born of contact, the 
idea, ‘this is mine’ occurs to him, the idea, ‘I am’ occurs to him, the idea, ‘this 
is my self’ occurs to him.”134 
  
One selects from the given components of experience, whether physical or 
metaphysical, and then identifies it as ‘this is mine’ (eta◊ mama), this ‘I am’ (esoha◊) 
and ‘this is my self’ (eso me attā). When he identifies himself, in an absolute sense, with 
physical or metaphysical components given in the experience, then he is obliged to 
perceive his created notion of self in accordance with the alleged nature of that 
component. If one identifies himself with some notion of metaphysical entity, then he 
attributes the qualities of that notion (such as immutable and, eternal) to so called ‘self’. 
Y. Karunadasa shows that in materialism one identifies the ‘self’ with a physical body 
and then it follows that with the breaking up of the physical body the so called ‘self’ is 
annihilated as well. He concludes,  
 
In the context of Buddhist teaching, however, what matters is not the 
permanence or impermanence of the object of self- identification, but the 
very fact of self- identification. Thus, Buddhists view both eternalism 
(sassatavāda) and materialism or annihialtionism (ucchedavāda) as two 
varieties of self- theory (ātmavāda).135 
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With this ‘initial error’ of self- identification, whenever one reflects on the nature 
of his self and its relationship to the world, he ends up by constructing a vast tangle of 
(metaphysical) views. Thus conceptual knowledge is embedded in the inherent belief of 
“self” and the existential need of self-identification.  
 
3.4    Embeddedness of Meditative Experiences 
 
 
It was clear from the above analysis that our conceptual knowledge and rational 
enterprises are under the crucial influences of prolific tendency and psychological urges 
of human personality. Beyond these ordinary sensory experiences there is a realm of 
experience recognized in the early Indian context, i.e. meditative experiences. These 
experiences result from calming the mind’s prolific and frantic activities through a certain 
form of training.136 Meditative practices are designed to shut down discursive thinking 
and thereby to calm conceptual development. In other words meditative practices aim to 
neutralize the habitual sensory responses. This process of deactivating the habitual 
sensory responses is termed, “deautomatization” by Arthur J. Deikman in his paper on 
mystical experiences.137For Deikman, “deautomatization may be conceptualized as the 
undoing of automatization, presumably by reinvesting actions and percepts with 
attention.” 138 He comments on contemplative meditation,  
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137 Arthur J. Deikman, “ Deautomatization and the Mystic Experiences” in Altered States of Consciousness, 
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In reflecting on the technique of contemplative meditation, one can see that it 
seems to constitute just such a manipulation of attention as is required to produce 
deautomatization. The percept receives intense attention while the use of attention 
for abstract categorization and thought is explicitly prohibited. Since 
automatization normally accomplishes the transfer of attention from a percept or 
action to abstract thought activity, the meditation procedure exerts a force in the 
reverse direction. Cognition is inhibited in favour of perception; the active 
intellectual style is replaced by a receptive perceptual mode.139 
 
As such meditative experiences are a consequence of a deautomatization of the 
prolific tendency of the mind and habitual conceptual framework.   As meditative 
experiences are said to be aloof from habitual prolific activities of the mind one might 
wonder whether these experiences are free from the influences of the factors of human 
personality completely. In other words, one might assume that meditative experiences are 
not embedded. 
 
Early Buddhist stance in this regard is quite surprising. Early Buddhism holds that 
although meditative experiences are produced by calming the mind’s prolific activities 
they are not completely free from the influences of one’s inner tendencies and urges. It is 
true that meditative experiences are free from the influences of the prolific tendency of 
the mind and they are resulted through deautomatization of habitual conceptual 
framework. Nevertheless still these experiences are vulnerable of misinterpretation with 
the influence of the other inherent beliefs and psychological urges of human personality. 
                                                 






The inherent beliefs and psychological urges particularly influence the interpretation of 
one’s meditative experiences. This points to the fact that the factors of human personality 
influence not only the perception but also, significantly, the interpretation of what one 
perceives.  Thus meditative experiences just as ordinary experiences are still vulnerable 
to various interpolations. In other words, meditative experiences cannot on its own 
strength safeguard against the influences of inherent beliefs and psychological urges.  
 
As we shall see, meditative experiences, just as in the case of ordinary experience, 
can be used as basis for justifying one’s presuppositions and beliefs or for the formulation 
of various views. The early Buddhist discourses reveal that even after a long course of 
meditative developments the meditators may still well engage in formulating various 
conflicting views. For example, The Brahmajāja Sutta reports,  
 
Here a certain ascetic or Brahmin, by means of ardour, endeavour, 
application, diligence, and right reflection attains to such a state of 
concentration that he dwells perceiving the world as finite. He thinks: “This 
world is finite and bounded by a circle. How so? Because I, by means of 
ardour …, attains to such a state of concentration that I dwell perceiving the 
world as finite. Therefore I know that this world is finite and bounded by a 
circle.” 
 
Here a certain [other] ascetic or Brahmin, by means of ardour, endeavour, 






concentration that he dwells perceiving the world as infinite. He thinks: “This 
world is infinite and unbounded. Those ascetics and Brahmins who say it is 
finite and bounded are wrong. How so? Because I have attained to such a state 
of concentration that I dwell perceiving the world as infinite. Therefore I 
know that this world is infinite and unbounded” 140 
 
The Mahā kamma vibha◊ga Sutta also further shows that meditators based on 
their particular meditative experience formulate views or theories regarding the world 
and the individual in general. Moreover they strongly adhere to those views and theories. 
The sutta says that some meditators attains to such a state of concentration that they 
develop certain ability to see the dying and reappearing of beings. A meditator through 
this ability sees a person here who engages in evil actions dies and reappears in a state of 
deprivation, in an unhappy destination. Then this meditator comes to the conclusion that 
indeed everyone who does evil actions will definitely after death reappear in a state of 
deprivation. The mediator is of the view that those who know thus know rightly; those 
who think otherwise are mistaken. The sutta says, “Thus he obstinately adheres to what 
he himself has known, seen, and discovered, insisting: ‘Only this is true, anything else is 
wrong’”.141  
 
The sutta further goes on to say that in another case a meditator with the same 
ability sees [contrary to the earlier case] a person here who engages in evil actions dies 
and reappears in a happy destination. This meditator also comes to the conclusion that 
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this is definitely the case for everyone who does evil actions. In the same way he also 
adheres to his view saying, “Only this is true, anything else is wrong”.142  
 
The above instances make it clear that psychological factors of human personality 
are involved in both interpreting meditative experiences and in developing attitudes about 
them afterwards. Meditative experiences may not necessarily eliminate one’s 
presumption or biases but instead may reinforce them. If we were not careful enough, 
meditative experiences in the disguise of a superior intuition may provide apparent 
verification for the beliefs or presumptions that we already had at the outset.  
 
Bhikkhu Bodhi provides an analogy in this regard.  
 
Suppose one were to lead a man wearing red-tinted glasses out from a small room 
to an open field in the hope of altering his perception. In spite of one’s hopes, the 
change in scene will not alter the colour of his vision but will only give him a 
larger area to perceive as red. As long as he continues to wear the red-tinted 
glasses, whatever he looks upon will continue to appear to him as red, for the 
redness is not a function of the object of perception but the subjective condition of 
the perceiver. The only way to get the man to see objects in their true colours is to 
remove the red-tinted glasses.143 
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In this case, early Buddhist critical evaluation of ordinary conceptual knowledge 
applies even to meditative experiences. Meditative experiences are only free from prolific 
tendency of the mind and habitual conceptual framework but not free from other 
presumptions and psychological factors of personality. “The red-tinted glasses” in the 
above analogy refers to those inherent presumptions and psychological urges of human 
personality, that is, the embedded layers of meditative experiences.  
 
Thus both ordinary and meditative experiences are embedded. The origin of 
knowledge is complex and interwoven with various factors of human personality. The 
above enumeration reveals those various factors that affect the forming of our 
knowledge. These factors are the embedded layers of experience. Thus the proliferating 
tendency of the mind, the habitual conceptual framework, inherent beliefs and 
presumptions, and psychological inner urges are presented in early Buddhism as the 









Deconstructive Nature of Early Buddhist Verification 
 
Given that experience is a construct and is embedded in several layers of 
personality (as discussed in the second and the third chapter), even a direct sensory 
experience does not culminate the process of verification in early Buddhism. The early 
Buddhist notion of verification is developed based on the understanding of embeddedness 
of experience. Thus both ordinary experience and meditative experience are not given an 
evidential value in early Buddhism unless embedded layers of those experiences are 
deconstructed. In other words, verification in early Buddhism has two important phases: 
having a direct sensory experience and deconstructing the embedded layers of 
experience. The latter phase is unique to early Buddhism. This unique aspect of the early 
Buddhist notion of verification, that is, its deconstructive nature is overlooked 
remarkably by both Jayatilleke and Hoffman.  
 
In this chapter I will demonstrate the deconstructive nature of the early Buddhist 
notion of verification. I will show that verification in early Buddhism requires a 
deconstruction of the embedded layers of achieved experiences and the so-called higher 
modes of knowledge in early Buddhism clearly exemplify this deconstructive nature of 
the early Buddhist verification. Further I will show that even meditative experiences 
recognized in early Buddhism are to be scrutinized and to be deconstructed. Then I will 






will point out that the deconstruction in early Buddhist verification is not a radical one 
but a gradual process.  
 
4.1 The Latter Phase of Verification  
 
The latter phase of verification that is unique to early Buddhism is the 
deconstruction of the embeddedness of acquired experiences. Employing the term 
“deconstruction” offers us a convenient tool to indicate the process of removing the 
embedded layers of our experience. To “deconstruct” is initially to be aware that 
experience is largely a construction on the part of the subject, and is embedded in various 
factors of human personality, e.g. the habitual conceptual framework, the inherent 
cognitive assumptions and presumptions, and the psychological urges.  This analytical 
awareness, in turn, allows us to dislodge those deeply embedded layers of experience. In 
a word, the term “deconstruction” offers the meaning of scrutinization and 
phenomenological removal of the embeddedness of experience. 
 
In the act of cognition generally one is under the influence of the attributive 
power of the habitual conceptualization, inherent presumptions, and psychological urges 
of human personality. With this attributive power one imputes false qualities to what he 
perceives. This tendency infiltrates our sensory experience and brings about distortions 
and perversions in our cognition. This fundamental warp thus resulted can range from our 
elementary cognitions up to our more complex judgments and beliefs. Thus our 






personality. This embedded experience is generally termed, “saññā” (lit. signs) in early 
Buddhism. The term, “saññā” shows that our experience is largely resulted through the 
activities of ‘sign’ making and of fake attributions, which occur in the cognitive process. 
Thus resulted attributions, perversions, and distortions or saññā in short are adventitious 
overlay to bare cognition.   
 
Deconstruction in this context means to discern the sense objects in their 
undistorted actual nature. What is to be deconstructed is these adventitious overlays of 
bare cognition. The analytical awareness of this embeddedness of experience allows the 
individual to alternatively “deconstruct” his embedded experience. Then one is able to 
discern, phenomenologically, whatever appears to his senses in their bareness. Thus in 
this context “deconstruction” works as a form of analytical scrutinization of the 
embedded layers of experience and phenomenological discernment of the sense objects 
as they are.     
 
It should be noted at the outset that the term “deconstruction” here is not to be 
understood necessarily with reference to the philosophical movement and literary 
criticism forged in the writings of the French philosopher Jacques Derrida.  In this 
philosophical movement the term “deconstruction” denotes a particular kind of practice 
in reading and, thereby, a method of criticism and mode of analytical inquiry. Derrida 
offered what he called deconstructive readings of Western philosophers. In this context 
deconstructive reading is an analysis of a text that uncovers the difference between the 






not merely as “a book” but as “ a (conceptual) texture” that underlies whatever spoken or 
written. Deconstructive readings show how “texts” cannot simply be read as a single 
author communicating a distinct message, but instead must be read as sites of conflict 
within a given culture or worldview. Though it is possible to see some resemblence 
between Derridean deconstruction and the Buddhist model of deconstruction, this study 
does not intend to compare them.144  
 
The form of deconstruction that is focused on in this study is one that works in 
our cognitive responses. To verify the empirical world as it is the deconstruction of 
overlays of experience is essential in early Buddhism. Regarding this Henry Cruise 
remarks:  
  
 Seeing and knowing the world correctly involved eliminating the 
‘theoryladenness’ of our observations, and the only way one could eliminate 
such colouring of our experiences was to be aware of our likes, dislikes, the 
theories or views we held to. Thoughts, feelings, habitual tendencies and so 
forth were all things we could and should observe and come to see and know 
correctly.145 
                                                 
144However comparative studies between Derridean deconstruction and the Buddhist model of 
deconstruction have recently been become highly interested among the scholars. Particularly these studies 
focus on discussing the limitations of Derridean deconstruction in the eyes of the Buddhist model of 
deconstruction. See David Loy, Nonduality: A Study in Comparative Philosophy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1988) and  “The Deconstruction of Buddhism” in Derrida and Negative Theology, (ed.) 
Harold Coward & Toby Foshay ( New York: SUNY, 1992) pp.227-253, Robert Magliola, Derrida on the 
Mend, (West Lafayette,  Indiana:  Purdue  University  Press,1984),  pp.  126-128, Lara Braitstein “No 
Views is Good Views: A Comparative Study of Nagarjuna’s Sunyata and Derrida’s Différance” in 
Consciousness, Literature and the Arts, Volume 5 Number 2, August 2004 
145 Henry Cruise, “Early Buddhism: Some recent misconceptions” in Philosophy East and West, Vol.33 No. 







As we saw earlier the process of samannesanā lays down the method of verifying 
the efficacy of a teaching or a doctrine. However, in the early Buddhist viewpoint even 
after one verified the efficacy of a teaching and established the analysis of that teaching 
as a model of reality, one’s process of verification does not culminate there.  The 
important task is to personally experience reality itself. The latter steps of the process of 
samannesanā namely, making effort (ussahati), weighing up (tuleti) resolutely striving 
(padahati), and personally realizing (sacchikaroti) and penetrating (ativijjha passati) 
refer to the process of personally experiencing reality. The above steps of the process of 
samannesanā may be interpreted as standing for the latter phase of early Buddhist 
verification which is deconstructive in nature. While the early steps of the process of 
samannesanā have an experiential outlook, the latter part of the process that is signified 
by the above-mentioned steps has a deconstructive nature. Those steps of the process of 
samannesanā aim at deconstructing the embeddedness of one’s acquired experiences. In 
the context of the process of samannesanā, the deconstructive nature of early Buddhist 
verification is not much emphasized. However, this deconstructive nature is explicit in 
other contexts which will be discussed later.  
 
The possibility of deconstructing embedded layers of experience is evident in the 







“Train yourself, Bāhiya, thus: In the seen there will be only the seen, in the 
heard there will be only the heard, in the sensed there will be only the sensed, 
in the cognized there will be only the cognized”146  
 
The instruction here is to maintain a passive awareness of whatever arises in sense 
experience without allowing habitual constructive cognitive reactions to arise. This 
passage clearly shows the deconstructive nature of early Buddhist verification.  
 
There are two important technical methods proposed in early Buddhism to be 
employed initially in this process of verification. The first is called “sati” which is 
mindfulness, or more precisely, bare awareness. The above passage also indicates this 
method. Sati stands for a form of introspective awareness towards one’s sensory process. 
It can be developed as a mental skill of watching internal responses to the sensory 
environment. This skill is to be employed while a sensory experience is taking place. 
Thus it seems to be also a momentary awareness. The stronger this awareness is the more 
one notices the distortion in one’s experience. Regarding sati, Analayo comments,  
 
Of central importance in this context is the receptive quality of mindfulness, 
which allows full attention to be given to the cognized data. Of equal 
significance would also be sati’s bare and choiceless qualities, which help to 
avoid immediate reactions and conceptualizations. An application of bare 
                                                 
146 Udāna p. 8:  Tasmātiha te, Bāhiya, eva◊ sikkhitabba◊- ‘di††he di††hamatta◊ bhavissati, sute 
sutamatta◊ bhavissati, mute mutamatta◊ bhavissati, viññāte viññātamatta◊ bhavissati’ ti. Here I follow 







awareness to the early stages of perceptual process can make habitual reactions 
conscious and would thereby allow an assessment of the extent to which one is 
reacting automatically and without conscious deliberation. In addition, passive 
and non-judgmental awareness can reveal the selective and filtering 
mechanisms of perception, enabling one to realize the extent to which 
subjective experience mirrors one’s hitherto unconscious presumptions.147    
 
The other method is “yoniso manasikåra” which is generally understood as proper 
reflection on a sensory experience. “Yoniso” etymologically means “down to its origin”. 
So the above term can mean “reflection by way of origin”148, that is, to reflect on a sense 
experience noticing how it comes about. It is a reflective awareness, which seems to be 
employed after a sensory experience. As this method focuses on the origin of sensory 
experience (yoniso) and probably on how it manifests itself, it seems to work as an 
analytic method. It is with this analytic treatment of sense experience that one is able to 
see properly the way sense experience is constructed.  This skill allows one to realize the 
effects of various factors towards an experience and posits a caution for proper treatment 
of experiential data in verification. These two skills are regarded as important devices of 
early Buddhist verification. They are devices of deconstructing the embedded layers of 
experience.  
                                                 
147 Satipa††hāna (Birmingham, Windhorse Publications, 2003) p. 228 
148 PED explains the term as “fixing one’s attention with a purpose or thoroughly”. The opposite of this, 
“ayoniso manasikāra” is explained as “disorderly or distracted attention”.  This gives a clue that the term in 







4.2  Higher Modes of Knowledge 
 
It is interesting to note that early Buddhist discourses employ several cognitive 
terms to signify these different modes of knowing which are derived from the same root 
‘√ñā’ (to know).  Saññā signifies most ordinary sensory responses charged with 
conceptualization as shown above. The cognitive terms, pariññā, abhiññā and paññā, 
signify precise ways of knowing which are deconstructive in nature.  Early Buddhist 
discourses often referred to the verbal forms of these terms respectively, parijānāti, 
abhijānāti, and pajānāti. Denotations of the above cognitive terms are to be understood 
within the contexts of their occurrences. Taken together they all synonymously refer to 
transformed and developed way of knowing as a result of deconstructing embedded 
layers of experience. Although these terms occur sometimes interchangeably, it seems 
that generally each term emphasizes a certain aspect of the above-referred transformed 
way of knowing. 
 
Parijānāti or pariññā signifies a wider perspective of knowing. These two terms, 
according to the contexts of their occurrences, seem to stand for a comprehensive 
understanding of the nature of experiential reality without being limited to a particular 
aspect. It seems that this mode of knowing is based on empirical observation of the 
multifarious aspects of sensory experience by overcoming habitual tendencies to see 






know) literally signifies “around”, “all around”, “completely”.149 Thus the term seems to 
imply a form of or macro vision. In a discourse pariññā is described as the 
comprehensive understanding of sensual desires in terms of their satisfaction (assāda), 
their perilous consequences (ådinava) and the possible freedom from them (nissaraˆa).150 
Then it seems that the realm of this comprehensive knowledge is not only cognitive but 
also emotive. As such it seems to signify a comprehensive vision one can develop on the 
nature of cognition and emotions without being influenced by their activities.  
 
Abhijānāti as a verbal form refers to a similar mode of knowing described above 
with special emphasis on overcoming the colouring of sensory experience by subjective 
prejudices. In the MËlapariyāya Sutta the ordinary way of knowing sense objects, 
“sañjānāti”, is replaced by “abhijānāti” in the cases of the advanced practitioner and the 
spiritually accomplished. It is shown in the sutta that “sañjānāti” leads to further 
conceptualization, proliferation and emotionally charged responses while “abhijānāti” 
does not lead to those activities. It seems that abhijānāti stands for knowing which 
surpasses unconscious assumptions and the limitations of one’s subjective perspective 
since the imputation of subjectivity is absent in this way of knowing as opposed to 
sañjānāti. The prefix “abhi” which means, in this context, “over”, “specially”, implies 
that the way of knowing referred to in “abhijānā†i” is a form of seeing through or 
                                                 
149 PED p. 421 






penetrating the constructive structure of general sensory experience. Abhiññā as the noun 
form of the verb, abhijānāti refers to the knowledge achieved in that way.151  
 
However the cognitive term, ‘abhiññā’, in some contexts, particularly refers to 
certain super cognitive abilities. Early Buddhist discourses enumerate six cognitive 
abilities.152 
1. Psychokinesis (Iddhividha)  
2. Clairaudience  (Dibbasota) 
3. Telepathy (Cetopariyaaya ñāˆa)  
4. Knowledge of recollection of past lives (Pubbenivāsānussati ñāˆa)  
5. Clairvoyance (Dibbacakkhu) 
6. Knowledge of the destruction of the defiling impulses (Āsavakkhaya ñāˆa) 
 
These special cognitive abilities can be understood as extending the capacities of 
the normal senses, especially the senses of vision, hearing and the mind. Interestingly, 
these super-cognitive abilities finally have to depend on the normal sense organs.153  The 
last one in the above list may be understood as introspective knowledge of one’s mind 
free of defiling impulses. 
 
                                                 
151 The term, abhiññā, in this sense, rarely occurs in early Buddhist discourses. This term often occurs as 
absolutive form of the verb, abhijānāti.  See D II 71, II 251, M I 71 (saya◊ abhiññā sacchikatvā 
upasampajja viharati)   
152 D III 281, S II 213-215. Jayatilleke takes abhiññā only to mean these particular extrasensory abilities 
and treats them as means of verification in early Buddhism but pays little attention the last one.  
153 In discussing supercognitive abilities, the Buddhist canonical text, Itivuttaka states that clairvoyance 
arises with the normal eye as basis. It is necessary to have intact a physical eye for the operation of 






The above six cognitive abilities are considered as some forms of higher 
knowledge in scholarly studies. Nevertheless, I interpret that those abilities are not forms 
of knowledge. Except for the last one, the rest can be seen as just means of knowledge. 
They themselves do not signify any piece of knowledge. They are avenues of knowledge. 
They give us sensory data which cannot be achieved through normal abilities of the 
senses. Nevertheless cognitive content of abhiññā does not go beyond the perception of 
material forms (rËpa), sound (sadda) etc. or some mental content such as memory. As 
P.D. Premasiri points out, the content of abhiññā experience, except in the case of 
āsavakkhayañāˆa, is not qualitatively different from the content of ordinary sense 
experience and the introspective experience of the mind.154 Thus, experience or 
information that we receive through them is still vulnerable to conceptualization and 
misinterpretation just as in the case of ordinary sense experiences. Even with the first five 
supercognitive abilities, one can reach erroneous conclusions about the nature of 
experiential reality. For instance, the Brahmajāla Sutta reveals how some contemporary 
thinkers had jumped into erroneous conclusions and had laid metaphysical theories on the 
basis of data that was gained through such super cognitive abilities.155 In this list, 
āsavakkhayañāˆa is unique to early Buddhism. It is claimed to be the knowledge free 
from influences of defiling influxes. “Āsava” is described in the discourses as influxes 
which may flow in during one’s sensory experience and influence the perceptual process. 
Āsavas are generally given as four types, i.e. influxes of sensual desire, of craving for 
                                                 
154 Sri Lanka Journal of Buddhist Studies, Buddhist and Pali University of Sri Lanka, Vol. 1, 1987, p. 54 






existence, of ignorance, and of views.156 They are seen as rooted in human personality 
and related to existential needs. In an ordinary perceptual process these influxes come to 
operate without any conscious intention of the subject.157 These influxes largely influence 
the construction of an experience and further development of the sensory process. 
External sensory environment is generally screened through āsavas in an ordinary 
perceptual process. Moreover sensory experience is further developed in lines with 
āsavas.  The influences of āsavas on the perceptual process result in distortions. 
Āsavakkhayañāˆa refers to the knowledge which results due to the destruction of āsavas. 
In other words it is the knowledge or sensory experience free from the influences of 
āsavas. According to the textual contexts of the term it seems that āsavakkhayañāˆa 
refers to both the introspective knowledge of one’s mind that is free from influxes and the 
objective knowledge gained through such a mind.  It further seems that other super 
cognitive abilities can be used properly for verification only when āsavakkhayañāˆa is 
present. Experiences through super cognitive abilities are prevented from being coloured 
by the subjective influences under the availability of āsavakkhayañāˆa. According to the 
mental culture explained in early Buddhist discourses, super cognitive abilities appear 
when āsavas and other influencing factors are suppressed in the mind of the 
practitioner.158 Still the possibility of misinterpreting experiences gained through such 
                                                 
156 D II 81. Some sutta accounts list only three āsavas without the last one. See M I 55. For a detailed 
discussion of āsavas and other related terms, see Premasiri, “Emotion” in Encyclopedia of Buddhism, S.G. 
Weeraratne (ed.), Vol. 5, Fascicle 1, pp. 57-64 
157 M I 9 






abilities is not completely removed.   Āsavakkhayañāˆa here plays a central role in 
properly applying other super cognitive abilities for verification.159 
 
Paññā or pajānāti seems to represent an aspect of knowledge which is quite 
similar to āsavakkhayañāˆa. This mode of knowledge signifies the recognition of inner 
factors that defile bare experience. It is said in the Ana∫gaˆa Sutta, 
Herein, when a person with a blemish understands (pajānāti) it as it actually is 
thus: ‘ I have a blemish (a∫gaˆa◊)160 in myself’, it can be expected that he will 
arouse zeal, make effort, and instigate energy to abandon that blemish…161 
 
Paññā, therefore, refers to a full awareness of factors and conditions that infiltrate 
into the perceptual process and bring about a fundamental warp throughout the entire 
body of cognition. This distortion can range all the way from our elementary responses to 
the data of sensation, through our more complex judgments and beliefs. This form of 
knowledge seems to capture not only the presence of influencing factors of experience 
but also the absence of them. It further said in the above sutta,  
 
Herein, when a person with no blemish understands (pajānāti) it as it actually is 
thus: ‘I have no blemish in myself’, it can be expected that he will not give 
                                                 
159 For example, dibbacakkhuñāˆa occurs at times as cutËpapātañāˆa as an application of the former. It 
seems that in early Buddhist context all other supercognitive abilities are not taken as they are but are 
applied in a certain way based on āsavakkhayañāˆa. 
160 Early Buddhist discourses employ a rich terminology on the factors that influence human personality, 
particularly perceptual process. Various terms such as kilesa, āsava, a∫gaˆa, refer to the same factors but 
each term emphasizes certain aspect of them.  
161 M I 26 (Tatrāvuso, yvāya◊ puggalo sā∫ganova samāno ‘atthi me ajjhatta◊ a∫ganan’ti yathābhËta◊ 







attention to the sign of beautiful, that by his not doing so lust will not infect his 
mind, and that he will die without lust, hate, and delusion, without blemish, with 
mind undefiled. 162 
 
Like the term, āsavakkhayañāˆa, paññā also seems to refer to both introspective 
knowledge that one is free from defiling factors and the knowledge gained through such a 
free condition of mind. Experiences gained through this form of knowledge are 
considered as free from undue assumptions, categories, and values that generally one 
imposes on the flow of experience. Paññā is in opposition to “perverted perception” 
(saññā vipallāsa)163 which results from falsely ascribing certain properties to sense 
objects. “Perverted perception” are described as being fourfold, i.e. holding the foul to be 
beautiful, the unpleasurable to be pleasurable, the impermanent to be permanent, and the 
selfless to be a self. Bhikkhu Bodhi remarks that perversions of perception are not 
inherent products of cognition, but adventitious overlays to the bare cognitive act making 
their appearance through distinct causes.164 The follower is advised to have un-perverted 
experience through paññā.  
 
                                                 
162 M I 27 (Tatrāvuso, yvāya◊ puggalo ana∫ganova samāno ‘natthi me ajjhatta◊ a∫ganan’ti yathābhËta◊ 
pajānāti, tasseta◊ pā†ika∫kha◊-subhanimitta◊ na manasi karissati, tassa subhanimittassa amanasikārā 
rāgo citta◊ nānuddha◊sessati; so arāgo adoso amoho ana∫gano asa◊kili††hacitto kāla◊ karissati) 
163 Perversions in perception are seen as common to ordinary perceptual process due to the subject’s false 
imputations to the sense objects. Other than perception there are two other levels on which these 
perversions (vipallāsa) occur. They are thought (citta) and views (di††hi). The perversion of perception 
occurs when the sense object is simply noted through one of the four distortional frames shown above. If 
the sense object is subsequently reflected upon in the same mode, a perversion of thought occurs. Through 
repeated reflection, a conviction arises that this frame yields an accurate picture of the object. See Bhikkhu 
Bodhi, The Root of Existence (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1992 (1980)) p.4 






O monks, material form is impermanent. What is impermanent is 
unsatisfactory. What is unsatisfactory is devoid of substantiality. What is 
devoid of substantiality should be seen as “This is not mine, this I am not, this 
is not my self”. One should see in this manner as it has really come to be with 
proper paññā.165    
 
This shows the deconstructive nature of paññā which penetrates imposed 
properties, categories and values. This deconstructive nature of paññā is explicit in a 
simile employed in an early Buddhist discourse to explain the function of paññā.  
 
It is as if a skilled butcher or his apprentice were to kill a cow and carve it up with 
a sharp butcher’s knife. Without damaging the inner mass of flesh and without 
damaging the outer hide, he would cut, sever, and carve away the inner tendons, 
sinews, and ligaments with the sharp butcher’s knife. Then having cut, severed, 
and carved all this away through, he covers the cow again with that same hide, the 
cow would still be disjoined from that hide.166  
 
The discourse explains the meaning of the simile,  
“The inner mass of flesh” is a term for the six internal sense-bases. “The outer 
hide” is a term for the six external sense bases. “The inner tendons, sinews, and 
ligaments” is a term for delight and lust. “The sharp butcher’s knife” is a term for 
                                                 
165 S III 22 (My translation)  






paññā, the wisdom that cuts, severs, and carves away the inner defilements, 
fetters, and bonds.167 (Emphasis added)  
 
Paññā is compared to a sharp knife, which cuts the constructed package of 
ordinary sensory experience, factors that build this package, and bondages that one builds 
on these constructions.  
 
Bhikku Bodhi remarks on the cognitive pattern of the person, who has developed 
these modes of knowledge,  
 
He does not add and does not take away. Whatever presents itself, presents itself  
as it is. It is seen in its bare actuality, shorn of all embellishments and conceptual 
proliferations. For him there is in the seen only the seen, in the heard only the 
heard, in the sensed only the sensed, in the cognized only the cognized.168   
 
It should be noted here that the higher modes of knowing do not refer to any 
realm of knowing beyond the ordinary sense organs. They scrutinize the embeddedness 
of sensory experience. As such the higher modes of knowing are just overcoming the 
embedded layers of experience by way of deconstruction. Beside the fact that it requires 
personal commitments, a higher degree of discipline and mental composure to achieve 
the skill of deconstruction, the higher modes of knowing are within ordinary sensory 
experience. The ordinary way of knowing and higher modes of knowing do not seem to 
                                                 
167 Ibid. 275 






be absolutely separable cognitive activities. The Mahāvedalla Sutta points out that the 
objects of ordinary sense cognition and that of higher modes of knowing are not different. 
“What one cognizes in an ordinary way, that one knows in paññā way” (ya◊ vijānāti ta◊ 
pajānāti).169 The same sensory data are going through several ways of knowing. We are 
responding to the same sensory environment. The difference lies only in the nature of 
cognitive response. That cognitive response is resulted through a scrutinization of the 
embeddedness of experience. Thus the higher modes of knowing are a form of 
penetration through the embedded layers of experience.  
 
 
4.3   Meditative Experiences  
 
 
In the early Buddhist point of view meditative experiences are not able on its own 
strength to safeguard against the influences of inherent beliefs and psychological urges of 
human personality. In other words, meditative experiences are not free of embeddedness 
by themselves. Therefore even meditative experiences are legitimate for scrutinization. 
They are scrutinized in order to deconstruct the embedded layers of them. Early 
Buddhism guides the meditator to scrutinize and to deconstruct meditative experiences.  
 
 
Meditative experiences recognized in early Buddhism are threefold. They are 
“Jhāna, Āruppā and Nirodha samāpatti.” The meditative states called “Jhāna” are 
regarded as an essential way of preparing oneself for enlightenment. According the 
meditational techniques described in the early Buddhist discourses Jhānic (Skt. Dhyānic) 
                                                 






experiences result from the perfect one-pointedness and tranquility of the mind achieved 
through continuous contemplation of meditational objects.  
 
The attainment of four “Jhānas” is described as follows:   
 
“Here, a monk, secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from 
unwholesome states, enters and dwells in the first jhāna, which is 
accompanied by applied thought and sustained thought with rapture and 
happiness born of seclusion.  
 
With the subsiding of applied thought and sustained thought he enters and 
dwells in the second jhāna, which has internal confidence and unification of 
mind, is without applied thought and sustained thought, and is filled with 
rapture and happiness born of concentration.  
 
With the fading away of rapture, he dwells in equanimity, mindful and 
discerning; and he experiences in his own person that happiness of which 
the noble ones say: ‘Happily lives he who is equanimious and 
mindful’―thus enters and dwells in the third jhāna. 
 
With the abandoning of pleasure and pain, and with the previous 






which has neither pain nor pleasure and has purity of mindfulness due to 
equanimity.” 170 
 
One important feature of these four jhānas is the gradual and progressive reducing 
of affective elements of those experiences. From the first jhāna to the fourth jhāna the 
factors or the components of jhānas are gradually dropped. The differences of jhānas are 
defined by their left out components. At the end the jhānic experiences are left with the 
attitude of equanimity or disinterestedness (upekkhā). 171 
 
Once the practitioner achieves jhānic experiences he is advised to examine the 
jhānic experiences in order to discover their characteristics of conditionality and 
impermanence. For this scrutinization, having entered into a jhāna one should emerge 
from it. H. Gunaratana explains,  
 
After emerging from a jhāna the meditator will proceed to examine the 
jhānic consciousness, analyzing it into its components, defining them in 
their precise particularity, and discerning the way they exemplify the three 
universal marks [i.e. impermanence, unsatisfying and selflessness]. This 
process is called sammassana ñāˆa, “comprehension-knowledge” and the 
                                                 
170 D II 314, M I 182, Translated by H. Gunaratana, The Path of Serenity and Insight (Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidas, 1996 (1985)) p.4 
171 It is this process, as it seems, that Arthur J. Deikman refers to by the term, deautomatization. (Altered 
States of Consciousness, (ed.) Charles T. Tart, New York, 1990, p.42) However Deikman does not seem to 
be aware of Buddhist meditative states in which not only discursive thoughts but also affective elements are 







jhāna subjected to such a treatment is termed sammasitajhāna, “the 
comprehended jhāna”.172 
 
This is where the deconstructive nature of early Buddhist verification is found. 
The early Buddhist verification goes beyond deautomatization. Meditative experiences 
resulted from deautomatization are to be further scrutinized in the early Buddhist 
verification. This scrutinization is done in a deconstructive way, that is, deconstructing 
presumptions, biases, inner urges which profoundly affect the interpretation of jhānic 
experiences. In other words it is a deconstruction of the embeddedness of jhānic 
experiences.  
 
Beyond these four jhānas, there is another fourfold set of higher meditative states 
which further deepen the serenity developed in the jhānas. They are called “āruppā” 
(immaterial states) as they focus on immaterial mental realms.173 The meditator sees the 
immaterial objects of concentration as more peaceful and sublime than jhānic experiences 
developed based on material objects of concentration. After experiencing and emerging 
from the jhānas one can direct one’s mind to these immaterial spheres of experience. The 
four āruppas are sphere of boundless space, the sphere of the boundless consciousness, 
sphere of nothingness and the sphere of neither consciousness nor unconsciousness. They 
must be achieved in sequence by changing the object of concentration. 
 
                                                 
172 H. Gunaratana, The Path of Serenity and Insight (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1996 (1985)) p.151 
173 The set of āruppās came to be called in commentaries as immaterial jhānas (arËpajjhāna) and, for the 
sake of clarity, the preceding set of jhānas are renamed the four fine material jhānas (rËpajjhāna). Often 
these two sets are collectively referred as the eight attainments (a  hasamāpattiyo). See H. Gunaratana, 






What is important in this context is the attitude and the response one is advised to 
maintain towards all types of experiences. The practitioner is advised thus,  
 
He thus ponders: This sphere of the infinity of consciousness is just a higher 
product; it is produced by higher thought. Then he comes to know: Now even 
that which is a higher product, produced by higher thought, is impermanent, 
of a nature to end.174  
 
One is advised to apply this critical attitude to all stages of meditative experiences 
in order to deconstruct unconscious presumptions and inner urges, which usually underlie 
experience in general. Early Buddhism maintains that all types of experiences that take 
place in meditative experiences are willful mental creations of the subjects. They are 
completely under one’s control and producible by oneself and importantly they are 
conditioned states of mind. All forms of experience are ultimately conditioned and still 
vulnerable to misinterpretations and distortions. Early Buddhist discourses strongly 
caution against positing the existence of anything permanent on the basis of those depth 
experiences. G. Dharmasiri comments in this regard,  
 
Therefore any kind of bliss resulting from an experiential situation would be 
considered essentially as conditioned and therefore lacking in any intrinsic 
reality. This basic argument of the Buddha becomes a sweeping criticism of 
all types of artificially induced mysticism like drug mysticisms, and 
                                                 






mysticisms produced by austerities. The Buddha is emphatically against any 
form of ‘cults of the mind’.175  
 
This characteristic is evident even in the highest stage of meditative experiences 
recognized in early Buddhism, which is called Nirodha samāpatti or Saññā vedayita 
niodha (The state of the cessation of perception and feeling). The distinguishing feature 
of this attainment is the cessation of all mental activity in its entirety, thus generally 
known as “cessation experience”. This attainment is seen as the result of the balanced 
application of both concentration and investigation (or insight). H. Gunaratana explains 
that a meditator wishing to attain cessation experience (saññā vedayita nirodha) enters 
each of the eight attainments (both jhānas and āruppās), in turn emerges from it, and 
contemplates each jhāna’s formation with insight as impermanent, unsatisfying and 
selfless.  After completing this procedure with each meditative attainment up to the 
mental sphere of nothingness, the next to the last āruppā and attending to certain 
preliminaries, the meditator determines to be without consciousness for a particular 
length of time. Then the meditator attains the last āruppā (mental sphere of neither 
perception nor non-perception) and after one or two turns of consciousness have passed 
the process of consciousness ceases; he becomes without consciousness, attaining to 
cessation. The meditator will remain in this state for as long as he has predetermined.176 
  
Thus this state appears to be a state of the stopping of the mental continuum 
altogether. As Dharmasiri points out, it is a transcendence of all possible forms of 
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experience by a radical negative experience. It is an experience only in the sense that one 
who undergoes it can think of it afterwards. It is not ‘an experience’ while it lasts.177 
However the above description shows that this attainment is a result of investigating the 
conditionality of all forms of meditative experiences. The balanced application of 
concentration and insight allows the meditator to understand that each meditative 
experience is ultimately conditioned. The investigation of the conditionality of meditative 
experiences allows one to deconstruct presumptions and inner tendencies which 
constitute the usual conceptual framework. It is in this deconstructed way that the 
meditator produces “the cessation experience” which is a transcendence of all positive 
forms of experience. Importantly even with this “cessation experience” early Buddhism 
does not posit any transcendental reality. The cessation experience in itself does not have 
any ultimate significance except for furthering one’s understanding of conditionality all 
experiences. 
 
Religious experiences, in the context of Western theistic religions are generally 
used to prove the existence of some type of ultimate reality. The above-explained 
experiences are in direct opposition to that. They do not prove any ultimate reality but 
rather simply allow one to see the transient and insubstantial nature of all types of 
experiences themselves. Scrutinization of meditative experiences aims at deconstructing 
the very need of permanent base and other inner urges.   
 
                                                 







4.4   Nibbānic Experience  
 
Nibbānic experience has been often misinterpreted by scholars as representing 
some type of transcendental reality.178 As such one may assume that Nibbānic experience 
does not have the deconstructive nature. Nevertheless a close examination of relevant 
records in early Buddhist discourses show that Nibbānic experience is essentially 
deconstructive in nature.  
 
In early Buddhist discourses Nibbānic experience is mostly explained in 
psychological terms. It is often described as the elimination of lust (rāgakkhaya), the 
elimination of hatred (dosakkhaya), and the elimination of delusion (mohakkhaya).179 
Early Buddhism attempts no metaphysical characterization of nibbāna, but lays great 
emphasis on its empirical characteristics which can be ascertained in the living 
experience of a person. In the living experience of a person it is said to be perfectly 
blissful as a result of a transformation of mental attitudes and dispositions.  
 
Nibbāna stands for the freedom that is attainable by man here and now 
from this unsatisfactory condition by eliminating its causes, which are 
primarily of a psychological nature by diligently pursuing a path of a 
self-discipline, mental culture, and development of wisdom.180 
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Buddha, 1957), and George Grimm (The Doctrine of the Buddha: The Religion of Reason and Meditation, 
1985) have attempted to give a transcendental interpretation of Nibbāna while Oldenberg (Buddha, 1927) 
has presented an annihilationist view on Nibbāna 
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As such the person who attained the Nibbanic experience by eradicating the 
unwholesome mental dispositions came to be aptly defined as “being cool” (s¥tibhËta) or 
“pacified” (nibbuta).181  
 
Transcendental or metaphysical interpretations of Nibbāna given by scholars are 
mainly based on a particular passage in the Udānapāli which literary reads, “Monks, 
there exists that which is not born (ajāta), not become (abhËta), not made (akata), not 
compounded (asa◊kata). Monks, if that which is not born, not become, not made, not 
compounded does not exist, there is no deliverance to be seen from that which is born 
(jāta), become (bhËta), made (kata) and compounded (sa◊kata)”.182 With the literal 
rendering of the passage it is easy for one to ascribe a transcendental or metaphysical 
meaning to Nibbāna. However both Rune Johansson183 and P.D. Premasiri have 
suggested that this passage should be read in the purely psychological sense with the 
context of Buddhist  doctrine of Dependent Origination (pa iccasamuppāda) and its 
scheme of emancipation.184 The terms ajāta, abhËta, akata and asa◊kata should not be 
read in isolation rendering them into English as “unborn”, “not become”, “unmade” and 
“uncompounded” respectively.   Human predicament or unsatisfactoriness (dukkha) is 
explained in the doctrine of Dependent Origination as a vicious circular process 
consisting of jāti (birth), bhava (becoming) kamma (volitional actions) and sa◊kāra 
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(mentally formed impulses). When one attains Nibbāna the above factors cease to 
operate.  Then the terms appeared in the Udāna passage, ajāta, abhËta, akata and 
asa◊kata being the negative aspects of the above terms simply mean that the above 
factors are absent in the Nibbānic experience. Nibbānic experience is that in which the 
process of birth [of a separate individuality], the process of becoming, the process of 
volitional formations, and the process of mentally formed impulses cease to operate. 
Then the Udāna passage renders not a metaphysical meaning but the meaning that it is 
possible to put an end to the operations of jāti, bhava, kamma and sa◊kāra.  Therefore 
Nibbānic experience is not that which awakens one to a transcendental reality. It is seeing 
the transient and unsubstantial nature of the empirical world itself.    
 
Thus, it is not at all similar to any type of the usual religious experience since no 
particular kind of ultimate reality is experienced there. It is rather a result of a 
deconstruction of inner urges, which distort ordinary experience and create the need to 
search for an ultimate reality. 
 
4.5   Gradual Deconstruction  
 
One should note that although the early Buddhist notion of verification functions 
as a deconstructive method, this deconstruction does not seem to be a radical one. It is a 
form of gradual transcendence of the embeddedness of experience. The early Buddhist 
verification aims to gradually deconstruct the embedded layers of experience. The 
concepts and views are to be made use of at the beginning of its gradual process of 






process of transcending them.  This gradual process of verification is clear in early 
Buddhist Discourse to Po  hapāda. 185 In this detailed exposition, “one finds the 
carpenter-like operation for the deconceptualisation of the mind whereby each successive 
‘peg’ is being replaced by a sharper one until at the end, he is able to pull out with ease 
the sharpest of them all.”186  
 
In this strategy of transcending all views, the first step is the “right view” (sammā 
di  hi). It is the initial conceptual view that all views should be transcended. It 
exemplifies the initial awareness of the probable illusive and delusive nature of concepts 
and views, the danger of adherence to concepts and views, the psychological motives 
behind views, all still within the intellectual and conceptual level. ‘Right view is 
essentially a view of the goal and not the goal itself’, but it aims at purging the mind of 
all views including itself. It embodies the seed of its own transcendence. This conceptual 
view, being the ‘harbinger’ of and a tool in the practical strategy, which at the end, must 
be replaced with internalized realization (paññå).  Ñāˆananda makes an insightful remark 
in this connection, 
 
The entire conceptual structure has to be left ―though gradually―and in the 
final reckoning, even those concepts that have rendered us the greatest help in 
our spiritual endeavour, have to make their bow.187  
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It is through this gradual and methodological development of penetrative skills 
that one can verify and deconstruct the embedded layers of experience and then penetrate 
into reality: ‘the way things flow’ (yathābhËta◊).  
 
4.6   Articulation of Some Differences  
 
 
With the disclosure of this deconstructive nature the early Buddhist notion of 
verification appears in a new light. My interpretation of the early Buddhist verification 
that underscores its inherent deconstructive nature offers a different understanding of the 
notion from the two interpretations offered by Jayatilleke and Hoffman.  
 
First, my interpretation of the early Buddhist notion of verification is based on a 
close study of the teachings of early Buddhism that disclose the embeddedness of 
experience. Early Buddhism explains the dynamics of our experience and interestingly 
reveals both cognitive and non-cognitive factors that are greatly influential in the making 
of our experience. Ironically, these influential factors are ignored or omitted in our 
discussions of human experience. In the early Buddhist reckoning it is extremely 
important to be aware of these so-called grists for our perceptual and rational mills for a 
complete understanding of the making of our experience. The realization of how our 
experience is embedded is of central importance in knowing how one should verify 
empirical reality as it is. In the view of my interpretation, early Buddhism proposes its 
notion of verification based on the realization that sensory experience is under the 
influence of inherent presumptions, tendencies and inner urges of human personality. 






early Buddhist emphasis on embeddedness of experience. Jayatilleke underscores the 
constant appealing to direct sensory experience in early Buddhist discourses but does not 
adequately discuss the embeddedness of sensory experience. Jayatilleke is correct to 
interpret the early Buddhist verification as being based on sensory perception. However, 
in my view, the process of verification prescribed in early Buddhism does not treat 
ordinary sensory experiences uncritically. As it has been shown in Chapter 3 early 
Buddhism considers that one’s sensory experience is not freely given but is largely 
embedded in several layers of human personality. Though early Buddhist verification is 
based on sensory experiences, as such it does not solely rely on them. Early Buddhism 
maintains a highly critical attitude towards the embeddedness of sensory experience. It 
should be noted that early Buddhism maintains this critical attitude not only towards 
ordinary sensory experiences but also with regard to heightened meditative experiences. 
Moreover Hoffman in his treatment of abhiññā (in the sense of the particular set of 
extrasensory abilities) does not take into consideration the critical attitude of early 
Buddhism. He tries to show that abhiññā is a personal experience that cannot be treated 
or analyzed objectively and therefore abhiññā is analogous to “religious experience” in 
the Western religious conception. Hoffman comes to this conclusion as he does not notice 
the early Buddhist disclosure that even meditative experiences including extrasensory 
abilities called abhiññā can be embedded in inherent beliefs, inner urges and such other 
factors of human personality. As we saw earlier Chapter 3 discussed how one’s 
meditative experiences can undergo the influences of inherent presumptions, 
psychological urges of human personality. According to my interpretation, the early 






ordinary sensory experience and the heightened meditative experiences. The novel 
interpretation that I present is sharply different from the other two interpretations in the 
sense that it captures the early Buddhist critical attitude towards the embeddedness of 
experience both ordinary and meditative.   
 
              The significant difference of my interpretation from the above two 
interpretations lies in recognizing an important phase of the early Buddhist verification, 
that is, the deconstruction of the embedded layers of experience. In my interpretation 
verification of empirical reality in early Buddhism does not culminate in acquiring direct 
sensory experiences. Verification in early Buddhism has other important phases: the 
phenomenological dislodging of the embedded layers of acquired experiences. 
Verification of the empirical world in its true nature necessarily requires a 
deconstruction, in a way of penetration, of various conditioning factors of our experience. 
However the other two interpretations do not recognize this important phase of 
verification.  In my view, both ordinary sensory experiences and the heightened 
meditative experiences are to be thoroughly scrutinized and deconstructed in accordance 
with the methodology of early Buddhist verification. My interpretation shows that, 
according to early Buddhism, verification of the empirical world in its true nature is 
possible only after the deconstruction of the embedded layers of ordinary sensory or 
meditative experiences.  
 
This study which sees verification in early Buddhism in a deconstructive fashion 






postmodern turn in philosophical thinking. One of the insights of postmodernist thought 
has been to reveal the theoretical embeddedness of observation. Generally observations 
are, in the postmodern view, inextricably dependent on the belief systems of the scientists 
who make them.188 Early Buddhism will add that observations are moreover embedded in 
the psychological factors of human personality. One may even see the early Buddhist 
method of verification as parallel to Husserlian “phenomenological – psychological 
reduction” which aims to establish a “disinterested spectator”.189 It may be possible for 
Early Buddhism to contribute much to postmodern thought. Nevertheless, this is not to 
suggest that there are no differences between early Buddhism and postmodernism. 
However it is a discussion that will have to wait for another occasion.  
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This study has examined two interpretations of the early Buddhist notion of 
verification, those of K.N. Jayatilleke and Frank J. Hoffman. It has been shown that these 
two interpretations quite remarkably fail to recognize a fundamental aspect of the early 
Buddhist notion of verification, that is, its inherent deconstructive nature. This study has 
argued that the early Buddhist verification is predominantly deconstructive in the sense 
that verification in early Buddhism requires a penetrative attitude on the part the subject 
in analytically comprehending and dislodging the embedded layers of experience.   
Chapter 1 presented Jayatilleke’s interpretation of the early Buddhist notion of 
verification. He underscores the given primacy of experience in early Buddhism and 
interprets the early Buddhist notion of verification in a manner akin to the empiricist 
tradition of Western philosophy. The thesis then discusses (1) Hoffman’s critique of 
Jayatilleke and (2) Hoffman’s position on the early Buddhist notion of verification. This 
second point states that the nature of “verification” appropriate to early Buddhism is the 
nature of a “religious experience” analogous to general Western theistic religious 
conception as defined by philosophy of religion. 
In Chapter 2 the limitations of these two interpretations are discussed. With 
regard to Jayatilleke’s I have underscored two shortcomings: (1) his overemphasis on the 
compatible aspects of the early Buddhist notion of verification with empiricism and (2) 






embedded in the habitual conceptual framework and various other psychological factors 
of the subject. Turning to Hoffman’s critique of Jayatilleke, I disclosed the degree to 
which Hoffman underestimates the experiential aspect of the early Buddhist notion of 
verification. Hoffman’s interpretation of saddhā as “a priori faith” (contra “rational 
faith” in Jayatilleke’s view) was shown as a misjudgment of saddhā that is appropriate 
for the early Buddhist verification. I further pointed out that Hoffman’s is partial towards 
Western religious models in his interpretation of the early Buddhist notion of verification. 
Further I have shown that Hoffman’s generalization of abhiññā as a generic religious 
experience in the popular sense led to his failure to recognize the essential deconstructive 
nature of the early Buddhist notion of verification.   
The readings of the role abhiññā given in the both interpretations were shown as 
problematic. In Jayatilleke’s treatment abhiññā is taken to mean particular six 
extrasensory abilities (with little emphasis on the last one). In this way abhiññā provides 
sensory experiences that are generally not available within the range of normal sense 
organs and these experiences, in Jayatilleke’s view, are legitimate verifications of the 
early Buddhist notions. Hoffman deems that these experiences involve religious practices 
and doctrinal assumptions. In his view these experiences are not legitimate verifications 
as they do not provide facts that can be verified or falsified objectively. As such the role 
of abhiññā is analogous to that of religious experiences in the Western theistic religions. 
However this study provided a broader interpretation of abhiññā based on the textual 
evidence. According to this interpretation abhiññā in the larger context of other cognitive 
terms do not mean only those particular extrasensory abilities but stand for the skill of 






extrasensory abilities, in my view, do not stand for any special mode of knowing that 
qualifies verification but are mere avenues of knowledge that provide sensory 
experiences beyond the range of normal senses. Ultimately these experiences are not 
qualitatively different from ordinary sensory experiences. As such it was shown that 
abhiññā in the sense of particular extrasensory abilities has no special role in the early 
Buddhist verification. Retaining   abhiññā in this restricted sense led Jayatilleke to 
confine the early Buddhist verification within empiricism and led Hoffman to liken 
abhiññā to religious experience in the popular sense. Consequently, both interpretations, 
as it has been shown, failed to recognize the essential deconstructive nature of the early 
Buddhist notion of verification.   
In Chapter 3, “The Embeddedness of Conceptual Knowledge,” I disclosed the 
factors of personality—both cognitive and non-cognitive—that profoundly affect 
individual perceptive experience that are not taken into account in Western empiricism 
nor in the discussion of religious experiences in the popular sense. These factors are the 
habitual conceptual frameworks, the inherent presumptions, and the inner urges of the 
human personality that are deeply embedded in experience. They are evident both in 
ordinary experience and heightened meditative states. Interpretation of the early Buddhist 
notion of verification with strict reference to empiricism of Western philosophy or in 
regard to religious experience in the sense of Western theistic religious conception does 
not allow disclosure of this embeddedness of experience.  
In Chapter 4, with the given insight of the embeddeness of experience, this study 






deconstructive in nature. In this way early Buddhist verification both allows and demands 
a deconstruction of the embedded layers of human experience. It was further shown that 
both ordinary sensory experiences and the subtly perceptive ‘meditative’ experiences are 
to be thoroughly scrutinized and deconstructed in accordance to the methodology of early 
Buddhist verification. Therefore it is only after the deconstruction of the embedded layers 
that evidential validity can be given to either ordinary sensory or meditative experience.  
This study aims to reveal this fundamental deconstructive nature of the early 
Buddhist notion of verification that is overlooked in both interpretations. It was clear that 
both scholars interpret the early Buddhist notion of verification in line with the 
conceptions that are familiar to the West. As we saw, Jayatilleke interprets the early 
Buddhist notion of verification with a strict reference to the empiricism of Western 
philosophy while Hoffman’s interpretation rather clings to the Western conception of 
religion. It is interesting to note that Hoffman argues against Jayatilleke that it is not 
possible to “strait-jacket” early Buddhism into pre-conceived (Western) philosophical 
framework and having shown this impossibility he himself tries to “strait-jacket” early 
Buddhist notions into western non-philosophical categories, i.e. religion. This 
overdependence of both of these scholars on what may be called Western categories in 
their interpretations prevented them from recognizing the fundamental deconstructive 
nature of the early Buddhist notion of verification.  
Empiricism of Western philosophy places the ultimate evidence of our beliefs on 
perceptual experience. Empiricism believes that sensory experience (perception) can give 






obtained by our sensory experience (perception) deserves the ultimate validity.190 As such 
in empiricism sensory experience (perception) are certain, they are evidence that cannot 
be doubted by the person who has them. In distinguishing “ideas” and “[sensory] 
impressions” David Hume says, “All impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or 
inward, are strong and vivid:…nor is it easy to fall into any mistake or error with regard 
to them”191 The empiricist position that sensory experience (perception) is beyond doubt 
does not allow one to consider sensory experience as embedded phenomena. 
Consequently verification is accomplished once we have a direct sensory experience 
(perception) and it does not require any further scrutinization or deconstruction. Thus 
empiricist interpretation of the early Buddhist notion of verification does not have room 
to accommodate the deconstructive nature of it. It was not possible for Jayatilleke due to 
his strict reference to empiricism to take notice of the deconstructive nature of the early 
Buddhist notion of verification.  
Generally the Western conception of religion focuses on power[s] superior to 
man. According to F.E.D. Schleiermarcher “The essence of religion consists in the 
feeling of absolute dependence.” 192 In this religious model, (unconditional) “faith” plays 
a crucial role in the knowledge and practice of the follower. Religious experiences within 
this religious model are essentially regarded with ultimate validity. Religious experience 
is treated with intense realness and absolute authority. Those experiences are accepted as 
received by the individual passively with the influence of a supernatural power. It should 
be noted that within Western conception of religion these experiences are so authoritative 
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for the individual to whom they come that they do not require any scrutinization or 
objective analysis. Hoffman reads abhiññā in the restrictive sense following Jayatilleke 
and interprets abhññā, that is, experiences of the particular extrasensory abilities as 
analogous to religious experiences in the Western sense of the term, which are not 
legitimate for objective analysis. Hoffman’s treatment of abhññā as analogous to 
religious experience in the Western religious sense prevented Hoffman from seeing that 
even experiences of abhiññā are legitimate for further scrutinization. With this religious 
model in his mind he further failed to notice cognitive skills recognized in early 
Buddhism, which are used as devices to scrutinize and to deconstruct the achieved 
experiences.   
In comprehending the full significance of the notions of early Buddhism it is 
extremely important to refer to its context and its main purpose. Referring to the context 
points out the major problem of the above two interpretations of the early Buddhist 
notion of verification. And with consideration of the main purpose of early Buddhism one 
can see that the deconstructive nature is a necessarily inherent aspect of the early 
Buddhist notion of verification.  
The context out of which early Buddhism emerges, that is, early Indian thought, 
demonstrates a feature that cannot be fully described by the terms “philosophy” or 
“religion” in their Western sense. The view of reality and the way of life which may be 
viewed as philosophy and religion respectively in the West are always interwoven in the 






view of reality but also prescribe a way of life.  Rom Harré offers an insightful remark on 
this, 
It is evident [in Indian thought] that there was a considerable density of the kinds 
of activity that we would now call, “doing philosophy”. The pattern of the teacher 
and the student, who then in turn becomes a teacher, is found throughout Indian 
history. Teachers expounded their positions, at the heart of which were 
prescription of ways of life, including techniques for achieving enlightenment.  
These were buttressed by conceptual analyses, metaphysical arguments, 
epistemological discussions, and so on in a manner any Western philosopher 
would recognize as philosophical in the critical sense – the search for propositions 
and their assessment.193 
This shows that interpreting notions of early Buddhism purely in terms of 
“philosophy” and “religion” (in the Western sense of the terms) is problematic. The two 
interpretations of the early Buddhist notion of verification offered by Jayatillleke and 
Hoffman suffer from this problem.  Relying on these categories in their interpretations 
both scholars do not capture the full significance of the notion, particularly its 
fundamental deconstructive nature.  
The main purpose of early Buddhism is to solve the fundamental human 
predicament, which is termed as “dukkha” (suffering or unsatisfactoriness). The reasons 
for human beings’ experience of suffering or unsatisfactoriness lies in the way we 
perceive reality and in the unhealthy manner we respond to the reality perceived. 
                                                 







Therefore it is necessary that humans must change their way of perceiving and the 
manner of responding in order to overcome the predicament. To make this possible, early 
Buddhism recommends a radical inner transformation, which covers both cognitive and 
emotional aspects of the human condition. Thus, both the analysis and prescriptions of 
early Buddhism have a soteriological purpose behind them, that is, overcoming the 
fundamental human predicament, dukkha. As the rise of dukkha lies in the unhealthy 
manner of responding to reality one should overcome it. In the early Buddhist viewpoint 
the overcoming of the unhealthy manner of responding to reality lies in seeing reality 
correctly. The embeddedness of our experience in the habitual conceptual framework, 
inherent presumption and inner urges of human personality prevent us from seeing reality 
correctly. As such seeing reality correctly involves eliminating the embedded layers of 
experience. Thus the deconstruction of the embedded layers of experience is necessarily 
inherent in the notion of verification in early Buddhism.  
Thus it is clear that understanding the notions of early Buddhism with reference to 
its context and its purpose is extremely helpful in recognizing the full significance of 
them. It is through a close examination of the notions of early Buddhism within its 
natural context and purpose and without necessarily relying on preconceived frameworks 
that one can comprehend their full significance. This kind of treatment of notions of early 
Buddhism and those of Indian thought in general prevents misinterpretations and 
distortions of their unique sense. In this way we are able to learn about other possibilities 
of philosophical experience that can be opened up through cross-cultural encounter. 
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